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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST LAW - PRICEs - GEoGRAPHIcA. PRICE CUT HELD GROUNDS FOR
TREBLE-DAMAGE Surr UNDER SECTION 2(a) OF ROBINSON-PATmAN ACT. - Appel-
lant, Atlas Building Products Company of El Paso, Texas, a manufacturer of cinder-
concrete building blocks, maintained a virtual monopoly in the El Paso area. Ap-
pellant's El Paso price during the period in question was 23.1 cents per standard
block, delivered. Appellant also sold blocks in the Las Cruces, New Mexico area.
The delivered price in this area was 20 cents per block to principle building con-
tractors, which amounted to 75% of total area sales. The remaining 259 was sold
to Atlas dealers who sold retail at from 24 to 27 cents per block. Appellee, Diamond
Block and Gravel Company of Las Cruces, New Mexico, sold the same type product
in the Las Cruces area. Appellee's original delivery price was 22.2 cents per block,
with discounts to 21.74 cents on certain large contracts. Appellee was.approached
by its purchasers as to whether it could meet a 20 cent delivered price. It gave
this price to one builder for two or three houses, but was forced to discontinue, and
thereafter its price was 23.1 cents per block. Diamond's contractors thereafter pur-
chased all their blocks from appellant. In an appeal from a judgment for treble
damages in a private antitrust suit under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,' held: affirmed. Prohibitions of section
2(a) are applicable to price discriminations between different, but noncompeting
purchasers of products of like grade and quality. Atlas Building Products Co. v.
Diamond Block and Gravel Co., 28 U.S.L. Week 2107 (U.S. Aug. 1959), petition
for cert. filed, supra at 3131.
The issue of whether geographical price cutting was violative of the Robinson-
Patman Act was before the Seventh Circuit in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC.2
Anheuser-Busch, a national brewer, reduced prices on its beer in the St. Louis area
to practically equal prices charged for local beer while maintaining its premium
price in other areas. There was no discrimination among the St. Louis purchasers.
In an appeal from an FTC cease and desist order, the order was set aside because
there was no discrimination among local competitors. Anheuser-Busch's affirmative
"good faith" defense under section 2(b)3 of the Clayton Act was not entered into
because there was no violation of section 2 (a). The instant case specifically rejected
the Anheuser-Busch restriction upon section 2(a). Such splits and divergence of
opinion among the circuits are not rare in the twenty-three year history of Robinson-
Patman litigation.
To truly appreciate the act, it must be viewed in its proper framework, namely,
the federal antitrust laws. Antitrust legislation is based on the policy that it is in
1 Section 2 (a) of the Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . .
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen compe-
tition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them.... 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1952).
2 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 28 U.S.L.
WEEK 3147 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1959).
3 Section 2 (b) contains the following proviso:
Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller re-
butting the prima facie case thus made by showing that his lower price...
to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor... 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
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the public interest to preserve hard competition which will result in lower prices
to the consumer.4 It was to carry out this policy that both the Sheman Act s and
the Clayton Act6 were passed. The Robinson-Patman amendment shifted emphasis
to the competitor, and the hard competition theory was mitigated. Section 2 of
the Clayton Act prohibited price differentials "where the effect of such discrimina-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce." This section was aimed at large concerns, such as Standard Oil,
which employed less-than-cost spot price reductions as a means to eliminate local
competition. The Robinson-Patman Act, moreover, condemns any attempt "to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or re-
ceives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them ......
The latter provision is phrased in terms of competitor injury rather than injury to
competition.
The other section of the act pertinent here is section 2(b) .7 This section states
that the showing of discrimination shall establish a prima facie case, but provides
that the case thus established may be rebutted by showing that the lower price was
made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.
This is the statutory material upon which price discrimination cases must be
decided - no easy task when the courts are confronted with conflicting economic
theories and perhaps purposely ambiguous statutory language.8 There have been
three basic stages in court reaction to the Robinson-Patman Act: 1) conservative
enforcement of early years, 2) radical expansion of the 1940's, and 3) vacillation
of the 1950's with a tendency to retreat, the extent and direction of which is as
yet uncertain.
The first stage was evidenced by many dismissals for the primary reasons of
slight detriment to competition and de minimis effect of price differentials. The
second stage, that of expansion, is heralded by cases such as Corn Products Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission'° which found competition among distant purchasers
and declared that it was sufficient that the practice" may have the proscribed effect.
In Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC12 the court over-ruled precedent to shift to the
defendant the burden of showing an absence of injury to competition.
In FTC v. Morton Salt Co.' the Supreme Court held that it was merely
necessary to show a reasonable possbility of injury to competition rather than
probability, and that Congress considered discounts to purchasing powers to be an
evil unless justified by cost reduction or a good faith meeting of competition. The
Commission, in Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC 4 reached a high
point in the equating of price differentials with price discrimination by holding
that insofar as business is held or increased by a price differential there has been
an adverse effect on competition. However, this commission order was set aside
4 Morton & Cotton, Robinson-Patman Act-Anti-trust or Anti-consumer, 37 MINN. L.
REv. 227, 229 (1953).
5 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
6 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-13, 14-21, 22-27, 44 (1952).
7 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
8 Morton & Cotton, supra note 4, at 227, 229.
9 Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57
COLUM. L. RaV. 1059, 1074-85 (1957).
10 324 U.S. 726 (1945). The distant purchasers referred to were in such widely sepa-
rated areas as Kansas City and Chicago.
11 The practice referred to is the use of the base point system of pricing, in which the
price is computed by adding freight rates from some base point regardless of actual freight
costs. This was extended to multiple base points in FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683
(1948).
12 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945), repudiated in General Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 3 CCH TRADE
REG. RaP. 11, 697 (1954).
13 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
14 44 FTC 351 (1948), set aside, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951).
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on the grounds that the Commission had failed to show that the price differential in
regard to component parts hurt competition in regard to the finished product. 15
FTC v. Standard OilF" initiated the retreat from the extreme position of
injury to competitors back to the theory of injury to competition. This seems to
be the present judicial inclination.17 In the Standard Oil case the Supreme Court
recognized that price rigidity brought about as a result of strict enforcement of
the Robinson-Patman Act is inconsistent with the antitrust laws of which it forms
a part. The Attorney General's Report 8 commended the Supreme Court on this
decision and stated that it went far toward putting the Robinson-Patman Act in its
proper antitrust perspective and was consistent with national policy and practical
business methods of competition in which the consumer benefits from a flexible
pricing system. Further, the report declared: "The essence of competition is a con-
test for trade among business rivals in which some must gain while others lose, to
the ultimate benefit of the consuming public."' 9 As a result of this report and the
Standard Oil decision, there has been increased agitation by small business groups
toward strengthening the act. This pressure has caused some congressional activity
in this regard.20
The strong dissent in Standard Oil sums up the position of those who oppose
a relaxation in the enforcement of the act. As stated above, these opponents look
to competitor injury as indicative of injury to competition and emphasize the im-
portance of curtailing monopolies in their inception.
21
In the instant case, the Tenth Circuit indicated its basic approach to the
problem by stating:
Antitrust legislation is concerned primarily with the health of the competi-
tive process, not with the individual competitor who must sink or swim in
competitive enterprise. But as a necessary incident thereto, it is concerned
with predatory price cutting which has the effect of eliminating or crippling
a competitor. For, surely there is no more effective means of lessening com-
petition or creating monopolies than the debilitation of a competitor.
22
It went on to state that the jury below had been correctly instructed that in deter-
mining the "reasonable possibility" of injury to competition as a result of appellant's
actions consideration could be given to the price differential between El Paso and
Las Cruces, and that consideration could also be given to the appellant's size and
economic domination in its area of operation. However, the jury was cautioned that
only price differentials having the proscribed harmful effects on competition were
actionable.
This approach is in contrast to that utilized by the Seventh Circuit in Anheuser-
Busch, a contrast which is apparent from the following portion of that decision.
It is not every price difference that amounts to a discrimination in price
under the act. Price discrimination means more than a mere difference in
price. There must be some relationship between the different purchasers
which entitles them to comparable treatment.
23
Representative Utterback, a manager of the conference bill, referred to this rela-
tionship and gave as examples of it: 1) competition in the resale of goods, and
2) prices so low as to sacrifice some part of the seller's necessary costs and profit-
inevitably leaving the deficit to be made up in higher prices to other customers.24
15 Id. at 792.
16 340 U.S. 231 (1951), sequel, 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
17 A Symposium on the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Nw. U. L. REv. 196 (1954).
18 ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L ComM. ANTrruST REP. 180 (1955).
19 Id. at 164-65.
20 Rowe, supra note 9.
21 For further discussions of the Robinson-Patman Act and its judicial implications, see:
Note, 67 YALE L.J. 1073 (1958) and Note, 67 YALE L. J. 1246 (1958); see also, Note, 66
YALE L. J. 935 (1957); 71 HARv. L. REV. 1367 (1958).
22 Reasonable possibility, as opposed to probability was held to be the test in FTC v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 47 (1948).
23 Anheuser-Busch v. FTC, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 28 U.S.L. WEnx
3147 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1959).
24 80 CoNG. REc. 9416 (1936).
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He declared, "But where goods are sold in different markets and local conditions set
different price levels, sale at those different prices would not constitute a discrimi-
nation under the bill.' '25 Since discrimination had not been shown in the St Louis
area, the court held there was not a sufficient relationship between competitors of
Anheuser-Busch in the St. Louis area and those in other areas of the country.
The Tenth Circuit relied heavily on Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.2 6 and
Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC27 in holding that geographical price discrimination
between non-competing purchasers is actionable under section 2(a). It also stated
that such discriminations were actionable prior to the enactment of the Robinson-
Patman bill.28 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit did not even discuss these cases. It
would appear that they are rightly ignored because in each case the price reduction
in question was so drastic as to be prohibited under section 2 of the original Clayton
Act.29 (The Tenth Circuit recognized this fact when it cited Puerto Rican American
Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.)3 0 Thus, it would seem that the reductions
in the instant case and especially in the Anheuser-Busch case (where the reduction
was only to existing competitive prices) are readily distinguishable from the above
cited cases.
In the light of the Standard Oil decisions of 1951 and 1958, the affirmative
defense raised in the Anheuser-Busch case under section 2(b) appears judicially
and logically sound. Although the Seventh Circuit did not find it necessary to dis-
cuss section 2(b), it is a defense of great potential. In the Standard Oil case the
Supreme Court held that a good faith reduction in price to meet a competitor's
price is a complete defense even though there may be a possibility of injury to
competitors. A proposed limitation upon this stand is the view that premium priced
products may not meet non-premium prices of competitors but must maintain the
premium differential."' Since this point was not at issue in the compared cases it
is beyond the scope of detailed analysis. However, in view of the reversal of the
FTC in the Minneapolis-Honeywell decision, the premium product argument is
weakened considerably. The reversal was on the grounds that the component price
differences did not substantially injure competition between finished product com-
petitors. Although the premium product charges of the Commission were men-
tioned, no discussion was given them.
In summary, the position of the Seventh Circuit in Anheuser-Busch is more in
line with current judicial interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act than is the
position of the instant case. At one time, protection of each competitor was the
best means to stop the growth of monopolistic corporations. Today, however, a
return toward hard competition with its resulting price flexibility will result in
consumer and public benefit as price stratification is broken by the competitive
process.
What direction the present trend, characterized as it is by vacillation, will take
may well be indicated by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Anheuser-Busch
case presently on appeal.32 The division between the Seventh and Tenth Circuits
will be decided there.
Edward M. O'Toole
25 Ibid.
26 248 U.S. 115 (1954).
27 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957).
28 See Puerto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d
Cir. 1929).
29 In the Moore case, the price reduction was from 14 to 7 cents for a pound loaf of
bread and from 21 to 11 cents for a pound and a half loaf. Similarly, the cut in the Maryland
Baking case was approximately 25%. Also, in the American Tobacco case, the loss to defen-
dant as a result of his reduction amounted to $175,000 annually.
30 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929).
31 For a contrast in the approaches to the Anheuser-Busch case compare 26 GEo. WAsH.
L. REv. 769 (1958) and 58 COLum. L. REv. 567 (1958).
32 Cert. granted, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1959).
RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - FEDERAL JURISDICTION - FEDE1AL COURT DENIED
JURISDICTION TO INVALIDATE STATE STATUTE FAIR ON ITS FACE. - The Alabama
State Legislature, by statutory enactment, altered the boundaries of the City of
Tuskegee, Alabama. Prior to 1957, the boundaries formed a square, and of the
5,397 negro population, approximately 400 were qualified voters. As newly defined,
the city is so irregularly shaped that all but four or five of the negro voters and
most of the total negro population have been excluded from the city, without a
similar effect on any of the 1,310 white persons residing there. Appellants, former
negro residents of Tuskegee, brought a class action seeking a declaratory judgment
to render the act invalid, contending that it effected an unconstitutional disenfran-
chisement and deprivation of benefits of residence in the city without due process
and constituted a denial of equal protection. The district court held that it lacked
authority and jurisdiction "to change any boundaries of municipal corporations fixed
by a duly convened and elected legislative body." I On appeal, held, affirmed. Since
there was no violation of appellants' fourteenth and fifteenth amendment rights on
the face of the statute a federal court has no authority to interfere with the enforce-
ment of the state's legislative act. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 2115 (5th
Cir. Sep. 22, 1959).
On its face the act in question did not indicate racial or class discrimination.
2
1 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958).
2 Act No. 140.
AN ACT
To alter, re-arrange, and re-define the boundaries of the City of Tuske-
gee in Macon County.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature, of Alabama:
Section 1. The boundaries of the City of Tuskegee in Macon County
are hereby altered, re-arranged and re-defined so as to include within the
corporate limits of said municipality all of the territory lying within the
following described boundaries, and to exclude all territory lying outside
such boundaries:
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of Section 30, Township 17-N,
Range 24-B in Macon County, Alabama; thence South 89 degrees 53 min-
utes East, 1160.3 feet; thence South 37 degrees 34 minutes East, 211.6 feet;
thence South 53 degrees 57 minutes West, 545.4 feet; thence South 36 de-
grees 03 minutes East, 1190.0 feet; thence South 53 degrees 57 minutes
West, 675.2 feet; thence South 36 degrees 19 minutes East, 743.4 feet;
thence South 33 degrees 50 minutes East, 1597.4 feet; thence North 61
degrees 26 minutes East, 1122.8 feet; thence North 28 degrees 34 minutes
West, 50.0 feet; thence North 59 degrees 11 minutes East, 1049.3 feet;
thence South 30 degrees 48 minutes East, 50.0 feet; thence North 50 degrees
08 minutes East, 341.1 feet; thence North 47 degrees 08 minutes East, 1239.4
feet; thence South 42 degrees 51 minutes East, 300.0 feet; thence South
47 degrees 00 minutes West, 1199.5 feet; thence South 64 degrees 09 min-
utes East, 1422.0 feet; thence South 24 degrees 13 minutes East 488.7 feet;
thence South 73 degrees 25 minutes West (370.8 feet; thence North 79 de-
grees 25 minutes West, 2285.3 feet; thence South 61 degrees 26 min-
utes West, 1232.6 feet; thence South 41 degrees 03 minutes East, 792.3
feet; thence South 12 degrees 03 minutes East, 842.2 feet; thence North
88 degrees 09 minutes East, 4403.6 feet; thence South 0 degrees 15 min-
utes West, 6008.2 feet; thence North 89 degrees 59 minutes West, 4140.2
feet; thence North 34 degrees 46 minutes West, 6668.7 feet; thence North
35 degrees 00 minutes West, 380.4 feet; thence North 16 degrees 55 min-
utes West, 377.2 feet; thence North 54 degrees 29 minutes East, 497.8 feet;
thence North 35 degrees 02 minutes West, 717.5 feet; thence South
54 degrees 03 minutes West, 1241.9 feet; thence North 36 de-
grees 09 minutes West, 858.4 feet; thence North 44 degrees 28 minutes
East 452.2 feet; thence North 22 degrees 33 minutes East, 4305.9 feet;
thence North 86 degrees 43 minutes East, 236.3 feet to the point of begin-
Sng'Section 2. All laws or parts of laws which conflict with this Act are
repealed.
Section 3. This Act shall become effective immediately upon its passage
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It was simply a legislative decree which changed the municipal boundaries. The
Alabama Constitution3 provides that the legislature may pass acts altering or rear-
ranging the boundaries of a city, town or village. The validity of acts passed pur-
suant to this provision has been upheld in cases before the Alabama Supreme Court.4
In the light of these facts, both the district court and the court of appeals decided
the case on two main grounds.
The first of these grounds was that the federal courts have traditionally regarded
boundaries as a political matter to be determined by the legislature. The question
of municipal boundary changes has confronted the federal courts on several occa-
sions. In Laramie County Comm'rs v. Albany County,5 the Supreme Court laid
down the general rule that counties, cities and towns are municipal corporations
created by the authority of the legislature, and they derive all their powers from the
legislature, except where provided otherwise by the state constitution. 6 The Lara-
mie court went on to note:
Unless the constitution otherwise provides, the legislature still has au-
thority to amend the charter of such a corporation, enlarge or diminish its
powers, extend or limit its boundaries, divide the same into two or more,
consolidate two or more into one, overrule its actions whenever it is deemed
unwise, impolitic or unjust, and even abolish the municipality altogether, in
the legislative discretion.
7
Such power is to be exercised in a reasonable and equitable manner." Subsequently,
in Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith 9 and Hunter v. Pittsburgh,1 the Laramie decision con-
trolled the boundary problems which confronted the Court. These same principles
are confirmed by the legal encyclopedias'-' and supported by the cases cited.
The second basis of the decision was that, since the state had the power to
change the boundary, the judiciary may not inquire into the motives which prompt-
ed the legislature to act. The court relied on Doyle v. Continental Ins. 1 where it
was observed that, if the act done by the legislature is not in violation of the Con-
stitution or the laws of the United States, the court has no power to inquire into
the legislature's intent.' Similarly in Hunter the Court denied itself authority to
review or criticize the policy, wisdom, justice or fairness of the act under consider-
ation.14
The instant court did not deny that certain statutes fixing boundaries may ex-
ceed constitutional limits, but it refused to search beyond the face of a statute for
any such violation. Apparently the court felt that such inquiry would overstep the
limits of the judiciary and be objectionable as a search for motive. Thus the court
concluded that since no racial or class discrimination appeared on the face of the
statute, it lacked jurisdiction to invalidate the act despite plaintiffs' allegation of un-
constitutionality.' 5 But, as the dissenting opinion points out,' 6 to apply these gen-
eral principles, without more, is to beg the essential question raised by the appellants.
and approval by the Governor, or upon its otherwise becoming a law.
This bill became an Act on July 15, 1957 without approval by the
Governor.
3 ALA. CONST. § 104 (18) (1901).
4 State ex rel Brooks v. Gullatt, 210 Ala. 452, 98 So. 373 (1923); City of Ensley v. Simp-
son, 166 Ala. 366, 52 So. 61 (1909).
5 92 U.S. 307 (1875).
6 Id. at 308.
7 Id. at 308.
8 Id. at 312.
9 100 U.S. 514 (1879).
10 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
11 See 16 'C.J.S. Const. Law § 145 (1956); 37 Am. Jura., Municipal Corp. § 35 (1941).
12 94 U.S. 535 (1876).
13 Id. at 541.
14 Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
15 270 F.2d- (5th cir. 1959).
16 Id. at-
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That question was whether the state actually has the power to make this change.
The appellants challenged such power on the grounds that this particular change
of boundary was discriminatory and violated due process and equal protection of
the laws. Since no state has the power to pass a law abrogating a constitutional
right, appellants contended that Alabama was powerless to pass this particular act.
Referring, then, to the instant decision, it should be noted that in two of the cases
which were cited as controlling, Laramie7 and Mt. Pleasant, no constitutional
question was raised. And the constitutional question presented in Hunter9 differed
from that which was raised here. There the attack on the statute authorizing an-
nexation was based on an alleged impairment of a contract between a city and its
citizens, and on an alleged deprivation of property without due process based on the
increased taxation caused by the annexation. Neither claim presented a substantial
constitutional question.20 The instant court indicated that an act fair on its face is
not the proper subject of judicial inquiry. The court may be unduly restricting itself.
It is true that a court may not inquire into the motive - the subjective intention -
of the legislature, but motive must be distinguished from purpose. It is well settled
that the purpose of a legislative decree can and ought to be inquired into by the
courts.21 That the total effect of a statute is to be considered in the determination
of its purpose was long ago indicated by the Supreme Court.22 Indeed, Doyle v.
Continental Ins.,23 the very case cited by the district court for the proposition that
motives are not justiciable demonstrates that courts do look to effect. The effect of
the contested statute in that case was to give insurance companies a choice to stay
out of federal courts or lose their licenses. The difference between that legislative
act and the instant one is that Wisconsin had every right to refuse to grant, or to
revoke, a license to do business. Hence, the Wisconsin statute violated no rights of
appellants. The total effect of the present statute, on the other hand, was to exclude
a body of Negroes from membership in a municipal community, thereby denying
them their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
By looking beyond the face of a statute to the facts and the effects, the Supreme
Court has in other situations resisted attempts at racial and class discrimination. In
this way the practice of excluding Negroes from juries has been stopped,24 and laws
permitting commissioners arbitrarily to exclude Orientals from a town or state have
been overturned. 25 But, of course, these cases might be distinguished from the in-
stant case. Some were declared unconstitutional for lack of standards, while others
were simply discriminatory applications of otherwise valid laws. The act in question
here required no standards and it applied equally to all within the class. Yet a brief
consideration of the facts is sufficient to demonstrate that this act was so drawn as
to insure that the class to be affected was composed entirely of Negroes. Even this
is not without precedent, however.
A similar problem was presented in Miller v. Milwaukee"5 where the State of
Wisconsin attempted to indirectly discriminate against holders of United States
17 Laramie County Comr'rs v. Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875).
18 Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879).
19 Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
20 As to the argument that a contract existed between the city and its citizens by virtue
of the relationship between the parties the Court observed: "It is difficult to deal with a
proposition like this except by saying that it is not true." Id. at 177. Hence, there could be
no unconstitutional impairment of contract. The argument that an increase in taxation re-
sulting from annexation deprived a person of property without due process had been denied
by the Court in Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881).
21 Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
22 Id. at 268.
23 94 U.S. 535 (1876).
24 See Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940);
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 857 (1934).
25 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885); See Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703
(1884).
26 272 U.S. 713 (1926).
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bonds. The bonds were owned by the corporation and interest from the bonds was
included with other corporate income and distributed to the stockholders in the
form of dividends. But the income from the bonds was not, under the prevailing
law, taxable by the state. Wisconsin circumvented this by a new tax law. Stock-
holders paid no tax upon dividends of corporations the income of which was as-
sessed; but if only a part of the corporation's income was assessed, only a correspond-
ing part of the dividends could be deducted by stockholders from their gross income.
The Supreme Court struck down this statute because it discriminated against United
States bonds. In his opinion, Justice Holmes thus stated the law:
It is a familiar principle that conduct which in usual situations the law
protects may become unlawful when part of a scheme to reach a prohibited
result. If the avowed purpose or self-evident operation of a statute is to
follow the bonds of the United States and to make up for its inability to
reach them directly by indirectly achieving the same result, the statute must
fail even if but for its purpose or special operation it would be perfectly
good. Under the law of Wisconsin the income from the United States bonds
may not be the only item exempted from the income tax on corporations,
but it certainly is the most conspicuous instance of exemption at the present
time. A result intelligently foreseen and offering the most obvious motive
for an act that will bring it about, fairly may be taken to have been a pur-
pose of the act ... A tax very well may be upheld as against any casual
effect it may have upon the bonds of the United States when passed with
a different intent and not aimed at them, but it becomes a more serious at-
tack upon their immunity when they are its obvious aim. In such a case the
Court must consider the public welfare rather than the artifices contrived
for private convenience and must look at the facts.27
It remains only to find the "prohibited result" in this case, and that must be
segregation. Recent cases in the civil rights area seem to have expanded the mean-
ing of equal protection. They suggest, if they do not say, that state enforced segre-
gation, in any manner, is contrary to the demands of equal protection.28 Segrega-
tion denotes inequality, and when state enforced violates the Constitution. Surely
this is the meaning of Brown v. Board of Education,29 above and beyond its holding
in regard to public education. For the court speaks of the effects of segregation, the
feeling of inferiority which it engenders and the psychological harms which it works.30
This discussion of the inherent inequality denoted by segregation was quoted with
approval in Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City3' in which a
statute authorizing segregation on public beachies was struck down. The same con-
demnation of segregation as violative of the equal protection clause is found in
recent cases involving restaurants,3 2 public golf courses,33 and public transporta-
tion.3 4 It seems fairly clear, then, that the mere fact of segregation or discrimina-
tion, when it is caused or upheld by a state statute is sufficient to invalidate that
statute.
Having announced the requirements of equal protection, the courts appear de-
termined to prevent evasions. To this end they have probed beneath the face of
many state statutes, notably the "massive resistance laws" which followed upon the
decision in Brown.3 5 And in the Texas primary cases" the courts sought the pur-
pose of the various state enactments by a consideration of the results.
27 Id. at 715.
28 Cahn, jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 150 (1955).
29 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30 Id. at 493-95.
31 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd per. curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1956).
32 Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Casey v. Plummer, 353
U.S. 924 (1956).
33 Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), reversing 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955).
34 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
35 See Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957); School Board
of City of Charlottesville, Va. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 911
(1957); James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959); James v. Duckworth, 170 F.
Supp. 342 (E.D. Va. 1959).
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The application of these principles to the instant case should be readily appar-
ent. The court ought not restrict itself to the face of the statute but should consider
the total effect. If, as it seems, the purpose and effect is to exclude Negroes from
the city the disposition of the case is clear. On the basis of Miller v. Milwaukee7 a
state may not achieve indirectly what it may not accomplish directly. This "back-
door" method of segregation by changing the boundaries is as violative of equal
protection as a frontal assault.
It may be that the problem bothering the instant court, perhaps controlling its
decision, is the problem of remedies. This difficulty was suggested some years ago
in Colegrove v. Green,38 cited in both the majority and concurring opinions. But
the difficulty in Illinois as presented by that case is clearly distinguishable from the
situation in Alabama. The complainants in Colegrove desired a redistricting which
would have called for positive action. It would have been virtually impossible for
the court to undertake such a reapportionment and to enforce its decree. This type
of action had to be left to the legislature. Appellants in the instant case seek only
a return to the status quo. That can be achieved by simply declaring this particular
act unconstitutional. If the legislature still wishes to alter the boundaries it may try
again, but this time on a non-discriminatory basis.
John I. Coffey
CRIMINAL LAW - GRAND JURY - COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ORDER IN-
SPECTION OF TRANSCRIPT OF DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY BEFORE GRAND JURY. -
Accused was indicted for soliciting a bribe, and for perjuring 'himself during the
grand jury hearing on the matter. Accused filed for inspection of the grand jury
minutes before respondent, Honorable John R. James of the Sixteenth Judicial
Circuit of Missouri. The motion was based on allegations (1) that inspection would
obviate the necessity of taking depositions, (2) that there were unauthorized per-
sons present while the grand jury deliberated, and (3) that the evidence before the
grand jury was insufficient and illegal. Respondent granted the motion, and or-
dered the minutes turned over to the accused. The State petitioned the Supreme
Court of Missouri for a writ of prohibition to stay the respondent's order, contend-
ing that respondent had exceeded his jurisdiction. Held: Affirmed in part. The
court has jurisdiction to order inspection of the transcript of defendant's testimony
before the grand jury and the testimony of those witnesses who endorsed indict-
ments. State v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959).
The history of the grand jury in Anglo-American law dates from the year 1166.1
Since that time, a policy of strict secrecy has prevailed under the common law with
regard to the proceedings of, and testimony before, the grand jury. The reasons for
grand jury secrecy today have been well summarized:
1. To prevent the accused from escaping before he is indicted and arrested
or from tampering with the witnesses against him.
2. To prevent disclosure of derogatory information presented to the grand jury
against an accused who has not been indicted.
3. To encourage complainants and witnesses to come before the grand jury
and speak freely without fear that their testimony will be made public there-
by subjecting them to possible discomfort or retaliation.
4. To encourage the grand jurors to engage in uninhibited investigation and
deliberation by barring disclosure of their votes and comments during the
proceedings.2
36 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1952); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1943);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1931); Hemdon v. Nixon, 273 U.S. 536 (1926).
37 272 U.S. 713 (1926).
38 328 U.S. 549 (1946), rehearing den., 329 U.S. 825 (1947).
1 ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROL! ARREST TO APPEAL 137 (1947).
2 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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Nevertheless, as these reasons have been obviated, or overcome by overriding
policy considerations, the veil of secrecy has been lifted. The criteria supporting a
relaxation in secrecy can be stated as follows:
1. In cases where a request for inspection has been made, the accused has al-
ready been arrested. Further, since the names of the witnesses are on the indictment,8
and the defense has the right to take depositions prior to trial,4 release of the min-
utes will have little effect on the security of witnesses.
2. The accused will have been indicted before requesting inspection of the
minutes. Information pertaining to third parties involved probably will become
public on trial, if pertinent.
3. Witnesses with particularly damaging information will have signed the in-
dictment, and will be subject to questioning by the defense before and during trial.
Secrecy with respect to their remarks before the grand jury, therefore, will not shield
them from exposure.
4. The vote and other proceedings of the grand jurors can be kept secret by
exhibiting only the transcript of the testimony of witnesses.
These criteria are usually accompanied by such language as "truth has nothing to
fear from light." 5
While some jurisdictions hold to the strict common law rule of total secrecy in
all grand jury proceedings," most allow relaxation, some by statute, others by judi-
cial construction. Of those jurisdictions in which secrecy is lifted by statute, some
provide for disclosure of the grand jury minutes, or transcripts of the witnesses' tes-
timony.7 Such disclosures are usually within the discretionary power of the trial
judge. In a few jurisdictions disclosure is a right of the defendant." In other juris-
dictions using statutes, the release of transcripts is obtained through interpretation
of the statutory oaths of witnesses, jurors, and reporters. These oaths usually require
strict secrecy regarding the proceedings "unless lawfully required to testify in rela-
tion thereto." 9 This phrase is so interpreted as to give the trial judge discretionary
power to make the transcript of the witnesses' testimony available to the defendant. 10
These methods of achieving a relaxation in the secrecy of grand jury proceed-
ings are most commonly used in those cases in which inspection is requested to
impeach witnesses, or in which the accused is charged with perjury before the grand
jury. In cases involving the impeachment of witnesses, some showing of facts to
indicate inconsistency is required. 1 In cases of indictment for perjury before the
grand jury, the accused is usually granted access to the transcript of his own testi-
mony.
12
Motions to review the evidence acted upon by the grand jury are generally ap-
praised critically." The courts have been reluctant to pass judgment on the suffi-
ciency of evidence before the grand jury.14 Such a procedure would be, in effect,
to indict and try the accused before the same tribunal.' 5 To do so would be to de-
3 See 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 948 (a) (1940).
4 See Ex parte Welborn, 237 Mo. 297, 141 S.W. 31 (1911); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law §
958 (1940).
5 Ex parte Welborn, supra note 4, at 34.
6 See, e.g., Lawder v. State, 154 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 1958).
7 See, e.g., FED. R. GRim. P.6(e); FLA. STAT. § 905.27 (Supp. 1958) (semble), as in-
terpreted in Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958); Ky. CRim. CODE §§ 110, 113 (Bald-
win 1959).
8 Ky. CRrM. CODE §§ 110, 113 (Baldwin 1959).
9 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 540.110 (1953).
10 State v. Pierson, 343 Mo. 841, 123 S.W.2d 149 (1938); State v. Goyet, 119 Vt. 167,
122 A.2d 862 (1956). See State v. Lack, 118 Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950).
11 Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361, 365 (Fla. 1959); See People v. McCann, 166 Misc.
269, 2 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Ct. of Gen. Sessions 1938).
12 United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1951); Minton v. State, 113
So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959).
13 People v. Liso, 186 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Queens County Ct. 1959).
14 Ibid.
15 State v. Shawley, 334 Mo. 352, 67 S.W.2d 74, 82 (1933).
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stroy the reason underlying the existence of the grand jury.16 Yet, upon a proper
showing of facts indicating that there may have been no legal evidence before the
grand jury, most courts have the power to grant an inspection of the transcripts of
the testimony in order to substantiate the charge.17 In other jurisdictions, however,
such inspection is flatly denied.18"
In the instant case the court decided that the accused could inspect the tran-
scripts of the testimony but not the minutes of the proceedings, since they had been
made secret expressly by statute. 9
This relaxation of secrecy was further qualified by the statement that inspection
could not be allowed on an allegation that there was insufficient evidence before the
grand jury, but could be allowed on the allegation that there was no legal evidence
before the grand jury. Up to this point, the court was in accord with the recognized
exceptions set out above.2 0 In the instant case, however, there was no record of
any showing of facts substantiating this allegation. The court apparently overlooked
this fact, thereby, in the absence of statutory provision, making this an unprece-
dented decision. 2L By contrast, a 1956 decision of the same court placed the burden
of proof on the accused to show good cause and evidence for the granting of a mo-
tion for a pretrial inspection of documents.2 2 It would therefore seem inconsistent
that these decisions should stand side by side. Hence, it might be concluded that the
principal case overruled the earlier position, and a trial judge in Missouri can now
entertain any motion for the inspection of grand jury minutes up to the point pro-
hibited by statute.
23
This result, however, could be avoided by interpreting the decision more nar-
rowly. The state contested the respondentes jurisdiction to order this exposure of
the minutes. There is language in the opinion which suggests that an approach
may have been adopted which raised the narrow question of whether or not the
power lay with the respondent to order exposure in such cases. In this regard the
court reasoned as follows: since the court could not hold that the respondent never
had discretion to order disclosure in any case, it could not deny the jurisdiction of
the respondent to so order in the present case. But if this is the only point decided
in the principal case, it is unfortunate. The state hardly intended to raise such a
narrow question, since it was already well settled in this jurisdiction.24 In the absence
of a recent similar case in this jurisdiction, this case afforded an excellent opportun-
ity for the court to spell out clearly a sound guide for trial judges in handling these
requests for disclosure. As asserted by the dissent, this the majority opinion failed
to do satisfactorily.*
Richard M. Bies
16 See Note, 45 Ky. L.J. 151 (1956).
17 E.g., United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (D.N.J. 1952); People v. Joslin, 129
Misc. 790, 223 N.Y. Supp. 59 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
18 Cf. State v. Garrison, 130 N.J.L. 350, 33 A.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
19 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 56.190 (1951), § 56.560 (Supp. 1958), § 540.10 (1953).
20 United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (D.N.J. 1952); People v. Joslin, 129 Misc.
790, 223 N.Y. Supp. 59 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
21 No case cited in the opinion allowed inspection on a charge that there was no legal
evidence before the grand jury without a showing of facts to this effect, and further research
has not disclosed such a case in any other jurisdiction.
22 State v. McQueen, 296 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1956). Which documents are in question is
not clear in the case. The language would include grand jury minutes, and if any documents
are to be so protected, the grand jury minutes must be within this class, as they enjoy the
highest degree of secrecy.
23 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 56.190 (1951), § 56.560 (Supp. 1958), § 540.110 (1953).
24 State v. Pierson, 343 Mo. 841, 123 S.W.2d 149 (1938).
* Subsequent to the completion of this writing, in a per curam opinion denying a mo-
tion for rehearing, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted their opinion in the instant case
as limiting inspection to such parts of the transcript of the testimony as would be relevant and
material at the trial. State v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278, 289 (Mo. 1959).
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FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - ExTRATERRIroRAL PERSONAL SERVICE
OF PROCESS - RULE 4(f) DOES NOT PROHIBIT STATE-AUTHORIZED PERSONAL
EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF PROCESS MADE PURSUANT TO RULE 4(d) (7).
Plaintiff instituted an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin against several defendants, alleging, among other things, breach
of contract. One of the defendants was a foreign corporation, the Western Hills Oil
Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma. A Wisconsin statute, authorized personal service of
process outside the state on a foreign corporation if the cause of action arose out
of the corporation's doing business in Wisconsin. Pursuant to this statute and Rule
4(d) (7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service was made on the corpora-
tion's executive vice president in Tulsa by a U. S. Marshall.
The corporate defendant moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction
on the ground that Rule 4(f) restricts service of process to the territorial limits of
the state in which the district court sits. Held, service was sufficient. Rule 4(f)
should not be interpreted as restricting state authorized personal extraterritorial
service made pursuant to Federal Rule 4(d) (7). Kappus v. Western Hills Oil
Company Inc., 24 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
Until recently it was held that due process requires service within the territorial
limits of the state of forum unless the defendant consents to jurisdiction.2 But it
is now well established that due process imposes only two restraints on the exercise
of jurisdiction over a defendant who cannot be found within the state of forum.
First, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the state so that the
exercise of jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice." 3 Second, the method of service must be reasonably calculated to
give the defendant actual notice of the action pending against him.4
It would follow that, under Rule 4(d) (7), a federal district court may, in a
diversity action, constitutionally use a state statute permitting personal extraterri-
torial service if the above two requirements are met. Rule 4(d) (7) provides that
service of process is sufficient "if made in the manner prescribed by the law of the
state in which the service is made." However, Federal Rule 4(f) states that process
"may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the dis-
trict court is held and, when a statute of the United States so provides, beyond
the territorial limits of that state." Hence we arrive at the issue presented in the
instant case: Does Rule 4(f) prevent the use of such a state statute?
The first judicial discussion of this question is found in the concurring opinion
in McCoy v. Siler,5 decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1953.
In that opinion, Judge Mars maintained that Rule 4(f) was a limitation on Rule
4(d) (7) insofar as extraterritorial service is concerned. He contended that, where
there is no federal statute to the contrary, Rule 4(f) confines service of process
to the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is sitting.
This view was rejected three years later by the same court in Griffin v. Ensign.
6
This case, as did the McCoy case, involved service pursuant to the Pennsylvania
nonresident motorist statute.7 It should be noted that nonresident motorist statutes
do not present the problem raised in the instant case. These statutes utilize the
popular device of appointing a state official as agent to receive service for any
suit arising out of the defendant's use of the state's highways." Since service is
technically effected within the state, possible conflict with the territorial limitations
1 Wisc. STAT. ANN. §262.09(4) (1957).
2 This belief grew out of the confusion caused by Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
For an exhaustive treatment of problems and trends in jurisdictional doctrines see Symposium
-Jurisdiction: Current Problems and Legislative Trends, 44 IowA L. REv. 244 (1959).
3 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4 Mifliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
5 205 F.2d 498, 501 (3d Cir. 1953).
6 234 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1956).
7 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1201.
8 For a current compilation of state nonresident motorist statutes see Nonresident Motorist
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contained in Rule 4(f) is avoided.9 But the Griffin court did not base its decision
on such a distinction. The court was clearly of the opinion that Rule 4 (f) was
not intended as a limitation on Rule 4(d) (7). It held that Rule 4(f) does not
address itself to or cover nonresident procedures authorized by state law which is
the subject of Rule 4(d) (7).
This view received the endorsement of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.10 That court held that the territorial limitations found in Rule 4(f) relate
to service of "federal process" only. Additional support of the Griffin decision is
found in Professor Moore's statement that "clause (f) evidently refers to ordinary
original service and was not intended to restrict the effectiveness of state sub-
stituted service when federal process is served in that manner." 11
In 1957 a district court in Illinois heard the first diversity action in which
Rule 4(d) (7) was used to effect actual personal extraterritorial service.1 2 Summons
in this case was personally served on the defendant, an Indiana resident, in Indiana,
pursuant to sections 16 and 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.s This statute was
the first legislation to abolish the subterfuge of appointing a state official as agent
to receive service of process for nonresident individuals and foreign corporations.
The statute permits personal extraterritorial service whenever a defendant does
any one of several specified acts within the state which constitute submission to
the jurisdiction of the courts of Illinois. The service was upheld on the familiar
ground that the language of Rule 4(d) (7) indicates no intention to restrict service
to the territorial limits, of the state; if the state statute providing the service is valid,
the service is valid.
It would be safe to assume that in the future more states will take advantage
of current liberalized concepts of jurisdiction by enacting statutes providing for
personal extraterritorial service of process.14 The Illinois-type procedure eliminates
the use of unnecessary fictions and more effectively meets the constitutional "fair
notice" requirement by giving the defendant actual notice of the pending suit. An
increase in the number of states adopting legislation of this type would, without
a doubt, bring before an increasing number of federal courts the question whether
Rule 4(f) restricts Rule 4(d) (7).
Since the United States Supreme Court and nine circuits have yet to decide
the question, it would seem that its final answer also lies somewhere in the future.
Meanwhile, a plaintiff relying on state-authorized extraterritorial service risks having
the federal court dismiss his action for lack of jurisdiction over the defendent.
When the Federal Rules were adopted in 1938 the belief was still current that
a valid in personam judgment required that the defendant either be served within
the state or that he consent to the state's exercise of jurisdiction over him. Statutes
imposing jurisdiction over persons not found within the state paid lip service to
this doctrine by adopting such devices as appointing statutory agents to receive
service of process. It appears that the rule makers, not anticipating another decade's
procedural problems, drafted Rule 4 to conform to such practices. The obvious
solution would appear to be an amendment to Rule 4. Is
Thomas Kavadas, Jr.
Statutes-Their Current Scope, 44 IowA L. Rv. 384 (1959).
9 Holbrook v. Cafiero, 18 F.R.D. 218 (D. Md. 1955).
10 Service by mail pursuant to a New York statute was upheld in Farr & Co. v. CIA.
International De Navegacion De Cuba, S.A_, 243 F.2d 342. (2d Cir. 1957).
11 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 419 (2d ed. 1947).
12 Starr v. Rogalny, 162 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Ill. 1957).
13 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16-17 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
14 Wash. Session Laws 1959, ch. 131; see Report of the Joint Committee on Michigan
Procedural Revision, 38 MICH. STATE B.J., No. 1, p. 34 (proposed rule 10.5.9).
15 In 1954 a suggestion was made to amend Rule 4(f) to permit service of process outside
the state at any point within 100 miles of the courthouse where the district court sits. How-
ever no action was taken. See: ADvIsoRY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE,
PRELIMNARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AmENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 1 (1954).
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IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES - JENCKS STATUTE - REQUEST FOR PRODUC-
TION OF NOTES USED BY POLICE-OFFICER WITNESS TO REFRESH HIS MEMORY
PRIOR TO TESTIFYING DENIED.- Appellant was convicted of robbery and assault
with a dangerous weapon. During the trial, appellant's counsel requested that the
court order a vital prosecution witness, a police officer, to produce notes which he
had taken during interviews with other witnesses, and which he had used to refresh
his memory prior to taking the stand. The trial court refused this motion, appar-
ently treating it as a request to see memory-refreshing materials. Held, affirmed.
The "Jencks" statute' governs, and the notes requested were not required to be pro-
duced under the terms of that statute. McGill v. United States, 270 F.2d 329 (D.C.
Cir. 1959).
The decision of the Supreme Court in Jencks v. United States,2 holding that
"the petitioner was entitled to an order directing the Government to produce for
inspection all reports of Matusow and Ford [government agents] in its possession,
written and, when orally made, as recorded by the F.B.I., touching the events and
activities as to which they testified at the trial," gave rise to a great deal of con-
troversy in the name of national security. There also arose the problem of protecting
government witnesses from possible impeachment on the basis of statements which
could not fairly be said to be their own rather than the selections, interpretations,
or impressions of the investigator.8
Because of the confusion evolving from interpretations of that decision by other
federal courts as to the limitations to be placed upon defense counsel's demands for
any government material obtained from witnesses,4 Congress attempted to define
the principle announced in the Jencks case by enacting into law the "Jencks" statute.
Its stated objectives in so doing were:
... to preserve the rights of any defendant under due process of law...
It is the intent of the bill to provide for the production only of written
statements previously made by a government witness . . . and any tran-
scriptions or recordings of oral statements made by the witness to a Federal
law officer, relating to the matter to which the witness had testified....
The proposed legislation is not designed to nullify, to curb, or to limit the
decision of the Supreme Court insofar as due process is concerned. 5
But even though the statute does serve to define the Jencks decision, questions
pertaining to the scope and interpretation of this legislation have arisen. Whether
section 3500 alone is to govern every request for production of government records in
federal criminal cases has not been determined. The Supreme Court recently in-
timated, by way of dicta, that such should be the construction given the statute.'
Other federal courts, however, when faced directly with this question, have refused
to construe the statute so broadly.7 And even in those cases where there is no ques-
tion whether section 3500 applies, it must still be determined whether the materials re-
quested have to be produced under the restrictive qualifications of the statute.8 Thus,
in each case where section 3500 is put in issue, the court must determine first that the
statute does apply, and if so, then whether the materials requested meet the qualifi-
cations of the statute.
1 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. V, 1958).
2 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957).
3 See 103 CONG. REc. 16116, 16739 (1957); H.R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957); S. REP. No. 569, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
4 S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
5 Ibid.
6 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
7 See Needleman v. United States, 261 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. David,
168 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
8 See United States v. Papworth, 256 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Angelet,
255 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1958); Lohman v. United States, 251 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1958);
United States v. Grunewald, 162 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. Waldman,
159 F. Supp. 747 (D.N.J. 1958); 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)2 (Supp. V, 1958).
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In the instant case the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to
grant defense counsel's request for the materials on finding that the "Jencks" statute
governed. But if the inference from another passage of this opinion is correct, 9 the
trial judge did not even consider the applicability of the statute, and appears to have
refused the request on the basis of the reasons enunciated in Goldman v. United
States.'0
A reading of the statute, however, would seem to indicate that the case at hand
does not fit the letter of the legislation." The request here was not made for pro-
duction of a statement that the police officer testifying had made, but rather was
for production of notes which he had taken in his capacity as a government agent
during interviews with other witnesses. Moreover, the request, at least apparently,
was made for the purpose of impeaching either the officer or those other witnesses,
but by means of statements made by those other witnesses, not by the officer himself.
That a real question does exist as to the applicability of the statute to this par-
ticular situation is illustrated by a decision of the Fifth Circuit, affirming a trial
court's refusal of a request by the defense for similar material. The court held that
such notes or memoranda could not be introduced for impeachment purposes under
the statute, and reasserted the rule set forth in Goldman,1 2 saying: "The case of
Goldman v. United States holding that it is discretionary with the trial court to
require or not to require a witness to produce memoranda or notes from which he
had refreshed his recollection before taking the stand was not overruled by Jencks."'
In United States v. David, the court held that "The statute . . . requires only the
production of the statement of a witness of the Government who has completed his
direct examination. It does not require production of the statement of any other
person. The court would have no right to extend the operation of the statute
beyond what its plain language requires."'14
The instant court makes only the general statement that the "Jencks" statute
does govern, citing Palermo v. United States.'s There, affirming a refusal to pro-
duce certain government materials, Justice Frankfurter wrote that "The purpose of
9 McGill v. United States, 270 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
Demand being made for the production of the notes, the court held that if
the officer had referred to the notes on the witness stand for the purpose of
refreshing his recollection while testifying, then counsel, upon request, was
entitled to look at those notes; but that if the witness had used these notes
simply to refresh his memory before coming to court, counsel would not be
entitled to require their production.
10 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942). Where a witness does not use
his notes or memoranda on the stand, the defense has no absolute right to their production. A
large discretion is to be left to the trial judge.
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. V, 1958).
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Govern-
ment witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant)
to an agent of the Government shall be the subject of subpena, discovery,
or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the
trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examina-
tion, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States
to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the pos-
session of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which-
the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate
to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order
it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
12 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
13 Needleman v. United States, 261 F.2d 802, 806 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 28
U.S.L. WEEK 3108 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1959).
14 United States v. David, 168 F. Supp. 269, 271 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
15 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
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the Act, its fair reading and its overwhelming legislative history compel us to hold
that statements of a government witness made to an agent of the Government which
cannot be produced under the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 cannot be produced at
all."'Is It should be noted, however, that this statement was severely criticized by
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion as
... ranging far afield from the necessities of the case in an opinion essaying
obiter a general interpretation of the [statute] .... I see no necessity in
the circumstances of this case which calls for a decision whether § 3500 is
the sole vehicle whereby production of prior statements of government wit-
nesses to government agents may be made to the defense.lr
Since the case at hand does not meet the requirements of the terminology of
the statute - the materials requested were not a statement of the witness - it must
be inferred that, by applying the statute, the instant court is relying upon legislative
intent - to preserve the rights of any defendant under due process - to support
this extension of the statute beyond its terms. The court, however, cites no author-
ity and makes no effort to justify or elucidate its reasons for so doing. Because the
Goldman rule was apparently applied by the lower court, has governed in a similar
case,' and evidently is applicable to the case at hand, the question arises whether
this court is holding that, in criminal cases where a federal agent is the witness,
section 3500 should be extended to the exclusion of the Goldman rule.
But given the assumption that legislative, intent - to protect the defendant
and, at the same time, to prevent "fishing expeditions" into government records'
- will support an extension of the statute to cover this situation, questions bearing
directly upon why the material requested here was not required to be produced
under terms of the Act, also go unanswered. Did the other government witnesses,
whose statements were the subject of the officer's notes, testify prior to the time
defendant's request was made? Section (b) of the statute would support a refusal
to grant such a request if they had not; 20 but if they had so testified, as must be
inferred from the fact that the court cites Palermo, then a valid refusal under the
terms of the statute could only have been premised upon one factor-namely, the
nature of the notes themselves. Because the term statement is defined restrictively
in the statute,2 ' it is of fundamental importance that the nature of the notes be
evaluated in the terms of this definition. An F.B.I. agent's notebook, in which he
had recorded substantially verbatim statements of a government witness during an
interview, has been held to be within the terms of the statute.22 If, however, the
Government's material consists partly of an agent's own impressions and comments,
and partly of a substantially verbatim report of the witness' own words, the defense
is entitled only to that part of those materials which purports to be the words of
the witness.23 And if the material requested is primarily analytical or interpretive,
and does not contain a verbatim account of the witness' own words, or is not
adopted by him, then such material does not fall within the scope of the act.2 4
The court in the instant opinion remains mute, however, on all of this, relying,
16 Id. at 351.
17 Id. at 360-61.
18 Needleman v. United States, 261 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 28 U.S.L.
WEEK 3108 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1959).
19 S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
20 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (b) (Supp. V, 1958).
21 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)2 (Supp. V, 1958).
a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcrip-
tion thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
made by said witness to an agent of the Government and recorded contem-
poraneously with the making of such oral statement.
22 United States v. Waldman, 159 F. Supp. 747 (D.N.J. 1958).
23 United States v. Papworth, 256 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1958).
24 United States v. Grunewald, 162 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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it appears, solely on the statement of Justice Frankfurter in the Palermo opinion
quoted above. 5 However, the Supreme Court was careful in Palermo to state why
the materials in that case could not be produced under the statute, saying:
We think it consistent with this legislative history, and with the generally
restrictive terms of the statutory provision to require that summaries of an
oral statement which evidence substantial selection of material, or which
were prepared after the interview without the aid of complete notes, and
hence rest on the memory of the agent, are not to be produced. Neither, of
course, are statements which contain the agent's interpretations or impres-
sions.
26
Whether or not Palermo does govern the case at hand poses a question the
answer to which can only be inferred. Was production of the officer's notes not
required because they were not approved by the witnesses themselves? Because they
were essentially the words of the agent and not of the witness? Because, in short,
they were not of that nature envisioned by Congress as necessary, in the interests of
due process, to the defendant's case? To all of this the instant court remains silent.
But if inference can grant license to generalize, then the case at hand holds
that the legislative intent will allow an extension of the "Jencks" statute to cover
the type of situation present here. Notes taken by a federal officer during his
interviews with witnesses must meet the restrictive qualifications of the statute, as
construed in the Palermo case, regardless of whether the agent is himself a govern-
ment witness and only uses the notes to refresh his memory before testifying; finally,
the "Jencks" statute, so construed, does take precedence over the Goldman rule, at
least where questions of federal criminal procedure such as those present here are
raised.
It is regrettable, indeed, that this court did not set forth its reasoning, clearly
and definitively, both for extending the statute and determining that production of
the materials requested here could not be required. Since this particular situation
would seem to be one that will arise in the future not infrequently, a careful and
considered discussion of the problems and questions raised would have been of real
value. In an area of federal criminal law already beset by so much controversy
and misinterpretation, authority by inference seems somewhat tenuous and unre-
liable, and, it might be added, of little assistance to other federal courts in estab-
lishing and asserting a clear and definitive way out of the Jencks morass.
J. Michael Guenther
INCOME TAX - FEDERAL - DEDUCTIONS FOR INTEREST ON ANNUITY CON-
TRACT LOANS DISALLOWED. - On December 20, 1951, petitioner paid the first of
forty-one premiums on an annuity contract purchased from an Indiana insurance
company. The next day petitioner, pledging the annuity as collateral, borrowed
from a bank an amount sufficient to prepay all forty-one premiums. The amount
borrowed was credited to the insurance company as a single premium payment
for the entire annuity. On December 24, 1951, petitioner.prepaid interest on an
anticipated policy loan against the cash loan value of the policy. On December 27,
1951, petitioner received the full loan value at 4% interest and thereupon repaid the
bank loan with the proceeds. In 1952 petitioner again prepaid interest on a policy
loan, immediately borrowing the increased cash loan value of the policy. Petitioner
deducted the two interest payments as an interest expense on his 1951 and 1952
25 360 U.S. at 351.
26 Id. at 352-53.
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income tax returns in the respective years.' In 1954 the Commissioner retroactively
disallowed both deductions. The full Tax Court reviewed the Commissioner's de-
cision and affirmed the disallowance.2 On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, held: affirmed. The transaction lacked substance
and was contrived for the sole purpose of avoiding income taxes. Weller v. Com-
miuioner, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959).3
The primary issue faced by the court was: did the 4% interest paid on the
policy loans constitute "interest" on indebtedness as conceived in § 23(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939?4
With the drafting of the Internal Revenue .Code of 1954, this issue was
legislatively resolved for the future by the disallowance of interest paid on annuity
contracts as deductions from gross income.5 However, petitioner's annuity contract
was purchased in 1951 and the deductions were taken in 1951 and 1952. Thus,
the instant court was compelled to review the interest deductions under the pro-
visions of the 1939 Code.
The tax codes of this country have long been a fertile field for disputes between
the letter and the spirit of the law. The allowance of certain deductions from gross
income in the calculation of taxable income have given rise to innumerable ingenious
plans whereby the taxpayer could "create" tax deductions with very little expense
or risk to himself.0 In examining these deductions, two general principles of tax-
statute interpretation have troubled the courts: (1) the common usage of the
words found in the tax statute will be the interpretation given them by the courts,7
1 The petitioner in effect purchased an income tax deduction at less than half price. The
structure of the transaction was as follows:
Income Tax
Expenditures Deductions
Initial Premium ......................................................... $ 2,500.00
Total Premiums (Bank Loan) ................................ 59,213.75
1951 Prepaid Interest ..........-. ..... 13,627.30 $13,627.30
1952 Prepaid Interest ................................................ 9,699.64 9,699.64
Gross Expenditures .................................................................... $85,040.69
Less:
Receipts From Annuity Loans
1951 Annuity Loan ........................................... $ 68,374.00
1952 Annuity Loan .............................................. 5,364.00
Total Loans .................................................................................. 73,728.00
Net Expenditures ....................................................................... $11,312.69
Total Claimed Deduction ................................ $............................................... $23,326 94
2 Carl Weller, 31 T.C. No. 5 (Oct. 10, 1958).
3 The facts recited are the facts of W. Stuart Emmons, 31 T.C. No. 4 (Oct. 10, 1958)
which is the companion case to the instant case and identical as to the facts.
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23 (b), 53 Stat. 1 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§
163 (a), 265 (2)):
Deductions from gross income .... (b) In computing net income there
shall be allowed as deductions: .... (b) Interest. All interest paid or ac-
crued within the taxable year on indebtedness, except on indebtedness in-
curred or continued to purchase or carry obligations (other than obligations
of the United States issued after Sept. 24, 1917, and originally subscribed
for by the taxpayer) the interest upon which is wholly exempt from the taxes
imposed by this Chapter.
5 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954 § 264 (a) (2):
Certain amounts paid in connection with insurance contracts. (a) General
Rule - No deduction shall be allowed for - Any amount paid or accrued
on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry a single premium
life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract.
Paragraph (2) shall apply in respect of annuity contracts only as to con-
tracts purchased after March 1, 1954.
6 An interesting example of the intricate plans devised to create tax savings is found in
Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959).
7 Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552 (1932).
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and (2) no consideration will be given to the motive of the taxpayer in making
the transaction."
The "common usage" principle may be found in a landmark case of tax law.
In Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner,9 the court disallowed the tax deduction of
interest even though sound financial theory indicated that the "interest" expense
claimed was part return of premium and part "effective" interest. ° The court,
averse to investigating the subtleties involved in the nature of interest, accepted
the common definition of "money paid for the use of borrowed money" with a con-
struction most favorable to the taxpayer. Further reflection, as will be seen later,
has caused the courts to reconsider the nature of "interest."
In Gregory v. Helvering" the court restated the principle that the motive of
the taxpayer should not be considered but qualified it by concluding that regardless
of the motivation of tax saving underlying the transaction, the purpose of the
statute should not be avoided. The transaction must be in accord with substantial
economic reality and must change the flow of economic benefits.-2 The Gregory
doctrine has become the rule,13 although the rule finds its best expression in Judge
Learned Hand's dissent in Gilbert v. Commissioner.'
4
In the area of disallowance of interest deductions, the Gregory doctrine has
been used in an inquiry as to "indebtedness" on which interest was being paid.
Nevertheless, in pursuing this inquiry, the court in the instant case was persuaded
to affirm disallowance of the deduction on the ground that the "entire transaction
lacks substance' 5 with only a casual reference to the lack of genuine indebtedness.
Other cases have delved more deeply into the subject and seemingly have evolved
two rules to be applied in determining whether there is genuine indebtedness. If
the repayment of the debt is so uncertain as to maturity, 16 or is so risky that it is
more venture capital than loan, 7 then the courts hold that there is no debt. Like-
wise, if the transaction imposes no real liability on anyone,' the courts will refuse
to view the transaction as creating a debt.
Either the rule of uncertainty as to maturity or lack of genuine liability might
be applied to the instant case. The annuity loan given by the insurance company
was secured by the cash value of the annuity. That cash value had been created
by a single premium payment which itself had been paid for with a bank loan.
The bank loan was satisfied with the proceeds from the annuity loan. The petitioner
was in reality borrowing what he himself had created at no substantial expense to
himself and without liability to anyone. There was no risk to the petitioner and
8 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
9 284 U.S. 552 (1932).
10 The taxpayer had sold bonds at a premium prior to March 1, 1913 (effective date of
the income tax statutes) and was amortizing the premium over the life of the bonds. Strict
accounting theory would hold that the premium is only a loan by the buyer of the bonds.
This is partially returned in each interest payment and thus all interest payments are part
"effective interest" and part premium return. The Tax Court contended that either part of
the interest should be disallowed as a deduction or the premium considered as income. The
court ruled that all the interest should be allowed. See generally KARRENBROCK AND SIMONs,
INTERMEDIATE AcCOUNTING 395-400 (3d ed. 1958).
11 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
12 H-iggins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d
Cir. 1957).
13 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Minnesota v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1938);
Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949).
14 "If however, the taxpayer enters into a transaction that does not appreciably affect his
beneficial interest except to reduce his tax, the law will disregard it; for we cannot suppose
that it was part of the purpose of the act to provide an escape from the liabilities it sought to
impose." Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957).
15 Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959).
16 United States v. Virgin, 230 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1956).
17 Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
18 Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Haffenreffer Brewing Co. v. Commissioner,
116 F.2d 465 (Ist Cir. 1940).
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no set maturity date for the principal of the loan. Heedful of the Tax Court's in-
ability to find any independent economic purpose in the transaction, the instant court
appears to develop the rule that, to comply with the statutory intent, the reduction
in tax must be a secondary result of a transaction entered into with economic
change as its end. The court was unimpressed with the way the transaction was
dealt with on an accounting basis by the insurance company. Thus, refusal to
accept accounting theories, which had worked to the taxpayer's advantage in the
Old Colony Railroad case, was invoked to the taxpayer's detriment in the instant
case.
The only other court to face the precise problem presented in Weller held
differently. The taxpayer in United States v. Bond"9 had entered into a transaction
identical in every respect to the Weller case except that in Bond the taxpayer paid
the first annuity premium and then immediately borrowed against the cash loan
value in order to finance the full payment of all future premiums. The annuity
contract expressly disclaimed any personal liability upon the annuitant (taxpayer)
and limited any recourse to the cash loan value. The court in Bond held that
interest paid on the annuity loan was deductible for income tax purposes.
It is doubtful whether the Bond decision can be used as precedent for any
other proposition than that interest on annuity contract loans was deductible for
income tax purposes prior to 1954. This can likewise be deduced by comparing
the 1939 Code with the 1954 Code. It is submitted, as similarly recited in Judge
John Wisdom's dissent, that the majority did not meet the issue. The question was
not whether interest on annuity contract loans was deductible before 1954 but
rather, was the deduction claimed in the Bond case "interest" as conceived in the
1939 Code.
The majority in Bond took judicial notice of the fact that there was no personal
liability upon the taxpayer under the annuity loan contract. It concluded that this
was immaterial insofar as the question of indebtedness was concerned. This was
so because if it were otherwise then the interest on annuity loan contracts and
interest paid by a mortgagor's assignee who assumes payment of mortgage interest
without liability for the mortgage would not be deductible for income tax purposes.20
The court's first proposition is of course the point at issue and thus begs the ques-
tion. In support of the second proposition the court cites section 26.03 of Mertens'
Law of Federal Income Taxation. An examination of this source indicates that the
reason the assignee may deduct the interest although he does not assume the
mortgage is that the assignee has an "equitable interest" in the indebtedness and
receives economic benefit from it. The taxpayer in Bond paid interest on a loan
the sole benefit to him being the creation of a tax deduction which, as was indicated
above, was insufficient grounds for a tax deduction. In essence then it would seem
that the majority in Bond overlooked the necessity of some personal liability, direct
or indirect, upon the taxpayer. It strains the "ordinary use of words" doctrine stated
by the Supreme Court in Old Colony Railroad to imagine a personal indebtedness
without personal liability, or at least the beneficial interest proposed by Mertens.
Secondly, the court in Bond ignored the fact that there was no fixed or certain
time when the principal of the debt came due. The loan was to come due only
when there was a default on the premium payments or when the total amount of
loans exceeded the cash value. Since the total premiums were prepaid the loan
would never come due under the first method. The taxpayer could continually
borrow up to within $1.00 of the cash loan value and thus be in complete control
of the loan's maturity. Nevertheless the majority held that the annuity loans were
indebtedness under section 23(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
Four months before the Bond decision the Fifth Circuit made an exhaustive
19 258 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1958).
20 United States v. Bond 258 F.2d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 1958).
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analysis of the deductibility of interest on indebtedness in Guardian Investment
Corp. v. Phinney.21 The case involved deduction of accrued interest on certain
second mortgages. The court disallowed the interest deductions on the ground
that the "indebtedness" lacked a determinable maturity date and genuine liability
on the part of the taxpayer, thus not representing genuine indebtedness.2 2 For the
purposes of an income tax expense deduction, very little difference can be found
between accrued interest on indebtedness and prepaid interest on indebtedness other
than the actual date of the money payment. It is difficult to reconcile the approach
of the Bond decision with the principles of genuine indebtedness set down by the
same court in the Guardian Trust case.
The court in Bond was not able to fully ignore the long line of decisions
repeating the Gregory doctrine and felt constrained to show some economic purpose
or change in the transaction. This the court did by an elaborate chart showing
that the insurance company received returns over and above the amount of the
interest payments of the taxpayer by reinvesting these interest payments and thereby
making a profit. This point is of no consequence because it is not the insurance
company which is claiming the deduction. The rule has been repeatedly recited
that the transaction must have been entered into by the taxpayer for some inde-
pendent economic reason. s The court in Weller relied on this general rule as the
basis for its decision. The transaction indulged in by the petitioner was "without
substance."
In summary, the errors made in the Bond case serve to indicate that the Weller
rule probably will prevail in any further litigation of the issue. Furthermore, the
misconceptions concerning lack of personal liability, definite date of maturity, and
substantial economic purpose serve to illuminate the nature of the theories under-
lying the Weller limitation on deductibility of annuity loan interest under the 1939
Code. Viewing the instant case in the light of the majority of the decisions in
the area of interest deductions, the result is simply the application of well-accepted
principles to a new set of facts. The absence of deep investigation into the bases
underlying the decision may be attributed to the easily applied standards that have
developed in prior cases. Where the tests for indebtedness prove overly complicated
the court can usually apply the "economic purpose" test without undue confusion.
John R. Martzell
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES - PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE - USE OF TERM PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE IN INSTRUCTION TO COURT-MARTIAL HELD ERRONEOUS. - Ac-
cused were convicted by general court-martial of various offenses in violation of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.' The defense presented no evidence at the
trial. During the law officer's instructions he gave the following charge:
Prima facie proof of an essential element of an offense does not preclude
the existence of a reasonable doubt with respect to that element. The court
may decide, for instance, that the prima facie evidence presented does not
outweigh the presumption of innocence. In law, prima facie evidence of a
fact is sufficient to establish the fact, unless it is rebutted.
21 253 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1958).
22 The taxpayer in Guardian gave its holding company a second mortgage on several
houses, payment of which was contingent on the payment of first mortgages to a bank from
the proceeds of selling the same houses. Taxpayer claimed a deduction for accrued interest on
the second mortgage. The court disallowed the deduction. Guardian Investment Corp. v. Phin-
ney, 253 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1958).
23 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399
(2d Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950).
1 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 985, 921, 930 (Supp. V, 1958). The
offenses are escape from confinement, various larcenies, and housebreaking.
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On appeal accused contended that the instruction shifted to them the burden of
proof, suggested a presumption of guilt, and did not require the government to meet
the standard of proof required by the law.2 Held, the use of the instruction was
erroneous but not prejudicial when all the instructions and the evidence were con-
sidered. United States v. Simpson, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 543, 28 C.M.R. 109 (1959).
The "burden of proof" placed upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, is not without ambiguity. In the above context
"burden of proof" has reference to the burden of persuasion, or as Wigmore terms
it, "the risk of non-persuasion."3 "The burden of persuasion simply does not come
into play until the end of the proofs, when the judge charges the jury... ." For
this reason the instructions must not effect, in the mind of the jury, a shifting of
the burden of proof to the accused. However, "burden of proof" has a second
meaning - necessity of producing evidence of a particular fact in issue - more
properly referred to as the burden of producing evidence. This burden can be said
to shift to the accused the duty of going forward with the evidence.6 . Presumably,
then, a point in the trial can be reached where, if the defendant fails to meet his
duty of going forward with the evidence, a prima facie case is established upon
which a jury may find a verdict of guilty.r The question is thus raised as to what
effect a prima facie case has on the presumption of innocence afforded to an accused,
and on the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The better view appears to be that the presumption of innocence is not "evi-
dence,"" and prima facie evidence, therefore, effectively rebuts it. Perhaps the most
widely used definition of prima facie evidence, and the one from which most of
the others appear to be derived, is that given by Mr. Justice Story in Kelly v.
Jackson:9 "such as, in judgment of law is sufficient to establish the fact; and if
not rebutted, remains sufficient for the purpose." He further stated that it would
be error for the jury to disregard it and, if not discredited, it should operate on the
minds of the jurors as decisive to found their verdict as to the fact.10
When speaking in terms of prima facie evidence a distinction must be made
between the legal effect and the practical effect of such evidence. Legally, prima
facie evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of guilty if not rebutted.-" An in-
struction that so stated the legal effect of prima facie evidence would not seem to
be erroneous. Yet if a jury were told that such was the legal effect, the practical
effect may be that in the minds of the jurors, the burden of persuasion has been
shifted, or that the presumption of innocence may have been replaced by a pre-
sumption of guilt. Anything which in practical effect minimized the burden of
persuasion placed on the prosecution would tend to lessen the burden of proof
beyond reasonable doubt and would appear to be prejudicial to the defendant.
Although the Uniform Code of Military Justice does not deal specifically with
prima facie evidence, the problem of prima facie evidence and the shifting of the
burden of proof in instructions has come before the courts-martial before. In United
States v. Miller'2 the law officer instructed the court that in his opinion the prosecu-
tion had presented a prima facie case which was sufficient to counterbalance the
2 10 U.S.C.M.A. 543, 545, 28 C.M.R. 109, 111 (1959). The dissent accepted this con-
tention and asserted that the error was uncured.
3 9 WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 2485 (3d ed. 1940).
4 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 307 at 639 (1954).
5 Id., § 306 at 636.
6 Id. at 637.
7 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 234 (1911).
8 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910); Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36,
51 (1897).
9 Kelly v. Jackson, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 622, 632 (1832).
10 Ibid.
11 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 234 (1911).
12 6 U.S.C.M.A. 495, 20 G.M.R. 211 (1955).
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general presumption of innocence and warrant a conviction if not controlled by
evidence tending to contradict it or render it improbable. The Court of Military
Appeals held that while the words were in some degree inartful and ill-chosen, and
came dangerously near shifting the burden of proof, they were not prejudicial when
considered with other instructions.'3 It has also been held that when a prima facie
case has been made out a conviction follows unless it can be rebutted and the
necessity of adducing evidence to rebut it devolves on the accused.'4
In Agnew v. United States' the jury was instructed that "such an inference
or presumption throws the burden of proof upon the defendant, and the evidence
upon him in rebuttal to do away with that presumption of guilty intent must be
sufficiently strong to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no
such guilty intent .... " The Supreme Court held that although the instruction
was open to objection for want of accuracy, it was not prejudicial when the charge
was considered as a whole.
The prima facie evidence presented by the government in the instant case
would seem to ,put the burden on the accused, not of proving their innocence,
but of raising a reasonable doubt as to the efficacy of such prima facie evidence.' 6
Such burden would be merely the burden of evidence rather than the burden of
persuasion which never shifts.' 7 In United States v. MullalyV 8 it was held that the
burden of going forward with the evidence shifted to the accused when the govern-
ment established a prima facie case. The Supreme Court has taken a similar posi-
tion.19 If this position were followed, the instruction in the present case would not
require the accused to prove their innocence, but would require them to raise some
doubt as to the prima facie evidence lest it be conclusive against them. Such a
rule would not take away their traditional right of not having the burden of proof,
as they would only have to introduce enough evidence to create a reasonable doubt
and would not have to prove that there is reasonable doubt.20
Here, however, the accused presented no evidence. Regardless of the position
taken, they would be seriously affected by an instruction which put the burden of
proof or burden of evidence upon them. For if they can be said to have the burden
of producing evidence to rebut a prima facie case, the effect of telling this to a jury
after the accused have presented no evidence will be disastrous. To avoid the con-
fusion of thought engendered in the minds of the jurors by the use of such terms,
it is submitted that their use should be avoided in jury instructions. Any necessity for
additional instructions to correct or clarify instructions previously given will likewise
be avoided and possibility of prejudice to the accused is minimized.
William I. Luff, Jr.
13 Ibid.
14 United States v. Dowling, 18 C.M.R. 670 (1954), pet. for review granted, 18 C.M.R.
832, motion for petition to withdraw granted, 18 C.M.R. 833 (1955); United States v. Han-
sen, 8 C.M.R. 231 (1952).
15 165 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1897).
16 See the instruction held valid in Fout v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 184, 98 S.E.2d 817,
824 (1957). But see, Chaffee & Co. v. United States, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 516 (1873).
17 For the distinction between burden of proof and burden -of evidence see 9 WIGMOR,
EviDENc., §§ 2485, 2487, 2494 (3d ed. 1940); Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory
Presumptions, 55 COLUm. L. REv. 527-549 (1955).
18 9 C.M.R. 150, 154 (1952).
19 Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 50 (1897).
20 United States v. Miller, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 495, 499, 20 C.M.R. 211 (1955): "... the
onus placed on an accused person by the law properly requires that he do no more than in-
duce reasonable doubt in the minds of the members of the court-martial .... " But see, Arthur
v. State, 227 Ind. 493, 86 N.E.2d 698, 700 (1949): "Any instruction by the court which ...
would in any manner place the burden upon the appellant to prove his innocence, or force
him to introduce evidence to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors, is erroneous."
See also the clarification of the term prima facie evidence suggested in Barton v. Camden, 147
Va. 402, 137 S.E. 465, 468 (1927).
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MAILS - INTERIM IMPOUNDING ORDER - POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT DENIED
AUTHORITY TO DETAIN MAIL PRIOR TO TERMINATION OF FRAUD ORDER PROCEEDINGS.
- Petitioner sent advertisements through the mails soliciting money for the purchase
of Tigron tablets, which would allegedly reactivate sexual potency and lost sex
energy. Relying on a report from the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, which disclaimed the alleged efficacy of the tablets, the Post Office Department
docketed a complaint against Tigron, recommending that a fraud order be issued
pursuant to 39 U.S.C. § § 259,1 732.2 Petitioner's mail was then impounded pending
determination of proceedings instituted by the Post Office Department for identifica-
tion of Tigron, in accordance with 39 U.S.C. § 2553 and for a fraud order pursuant
to 39 U.S.C. § 259.4 After the petitioner had complied with the identification re-
quirement, but prior to the fraud hearing, the interim mail impounding order was
extended by order of the Post Office Department. Petitioner then filed a complaint
in a New Jersey federal district court seeking a preliminary and permanent injunc-
tion restraining the enforcement of the extended interim impounding order. Held:
preliminary injunction granted. Until the administrative proceedings have ter-
minated in a fraud order, 39 U.S.C. § 2595 vests no authority in the Postmaster
General to issue interim impounding orders. Greene v. Kern, 174 F. Supp. 480
(D.N.J.), aff'd per curiam, 269 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1959).
The Constitution granted Congress the power to establish a postal system,6 and
the power to regulate the mails was su1sequently found to be implicit in this original
grant.7 As early as 1872 Congress authorized the Postmaster General to deny pay-
ment of money orders and delivery of registered letters to anyone he found to be
using the mails to obtain money by false pretenses.8 Further, at this time placing
materials in the mail in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme was made a crime.9
I This section provides:
The Postmaster General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that
any person . . . is . . . conducting any . . . scheme . . . for obtaining
money ... through the mails by means of false or fraudulent .. . repre-
sentations, or promises, instruct postmasters at any post office at which
registered . . . or any other letters or mail matter arrive directed to any
such person . . . to return all such mail matter to the postmaster at the
office at which it was originally mailed, with the word "Fraudulent" plainly
. . . stamped upon the outside thereof; and all such mail matter so re-
turned to such postmasters shall be by them returned to the writers thereof,
under such regulations as the Postmaster General may prescribe. Nothing
contained in this section shall be so construed as to authorize any postmas-
ter or other person to open any letter not addressed to himself....
2 This section provides:
The Postmaster General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that
any person . . . is conducting any . . . scheme for obtaining, money
... through the mails by means of false or fraudulent . . . representations,
or promises, forbid the payment by any postmaster to said person . . . of
any postal money orders drawn to his . . . order . . . any may provide by
regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in such money
orders....
3 This section provides:
The Postmaster General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him, that
any person is using any fictitious, false, or assumed name, . . . or address
in conducting . . . by means of the Post Office Establishment of the United
States, any business scheme for fraudulent purposes instruct any post-
master at any post office at which such letters . . . addressed to such
fictitious, false, or assumed name or address arrive to notify the party
claiming or receiving such letters, . . . to appear at the post office and be
identified; ...
4 17 Stat. 323 (1872), 39 U.S.C. § 259 (1952).
5 17 Stat. 323 (1872), 39 U.S.C. § 259 (1952).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
7 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904) (constitutionality of postal fraud
statutes upheld).
8 17 Stat. 323, as amended 26 Stat. 466, 39 U.S.C. § 732 (1952).
9 17 Stat. 323 (1872), as amended 66 Stat. 722 (1952), 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1952).
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Letters and other materials sent by mail for fraudulent purposes have been declared
non-mailable,10 and the Postmaster General's power to issue fraud orders was ex-
tended in 1895 to include all fraudulent material sent by mail.11 Other statutes
have also been passed by Congress seeking to protect the public against the fraudu-
lent use of the mails.'2
Post Office Department practices in fraud order cases are covered by regulations
promulgated by the Department 8 in conformity with the Administrative Procedure
Act.' 4 Although these regulations do not mention interim impounding orders, such
orders have been used by the Post Office Department. 15 They are issued at the time
a formal complaint is docketed against a supposed fraudulent use of the mails3-6
Once the impounding order is issued, all mail addressed to the suspect is detained
at his local post office pending final termination of fraud order hearings. There
is no administrative remedy available in an interim impounding situation; 7 hence,
injunctive relief must be sought from the courts?-s
Such relief was obtained in an early case, Donnell Mfg. Co. v. Wyman,19
against the temporary impounding order on the ground that no explicit statutory
authority existed for the order. In addition, petitioner's mail had been detained for
six weeks, and the court considered this an unreasonable amount of time. The
court, however, said:
This court does not now hold that the Postmaster General cannot make all
needful orders pending the hearing and in furtherance of the hearing....
It may be... that the Postmaster General can make proper orders to pro-
tect the public from schemes of swindlers.20
A recent decision, Williams v. Petty,2 ' on the other hand, denied injunctive relief to
a petitioner who had extended the length of time his mail was detained by requesting
a delay in the fraud order hearing. In dismissing petitioner's contention that no
statutory authority existed for the temporary impounding of mail prior to a fraud
hearing the court stated: "[iWt is my judgment that the authority to impound mail
pending a hearing is implicit in the authority of the Postmaster General to direct
that the mail be returned to the original sender after a fraud order is issued." (Em-
phasis added.) 22 An indication was also given that as long as there was no unreasonable
delay in the administrative proceedings, no relief from an interim impounding order
would be granted.2 In a later case, Barel v. Fiske,2' a petitioner, before the com-
pany involved had been adequately identified as required by statute in postal fraud
order cases, sought injunctive relief. Because of this non-compliance the court upheld
the summary impounding order, but indicated that even had petitioner satisfactorily
identified the company, "the Postmaster General has the authority to impound
10 25 Stat. 824 (1889), 39 U.S.C. § 256 (1952).
11 26 Stat. 466 (1890), as amended, 28 Stat. 964 (1895), 39 U.S.C. § 259 (1952).
12 Securities and Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 77, 906, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2) (1952); Federal
Trade Commission Act, 52 Stat. 114, 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1952).
13 39 C.F.R. § 201.1-34 (Supp. 1959).
14 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958).
15 See Hart, The Postal Fraud Statutes: Their Use and Abuse, 11 FooD DRUG CosM L.J.
245 (1956).
16 Greene v. Kern, 174 F. Supp. 480, 482 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curiam, 269 F.2d 344
(3rd. Cir. 1959).
17 If respondent desires to cease his activities without having a final determination on the
question of their illegality, he may file an affidavit to that effect in accordance with 39 C.F.R.
§ 201.11 (b) (Supp. 1959) and apparently the stop order will be lifted.
18 See Jaffe, The Right to judicial Review, 71 HAuv. L. Rnv. 401 (1958) and Kramer,
The Place and Function of judicial Review in the Administrative Process, 28 FoanHAm L.
REv. 1 (1959) for a general discussion on the right to judicial review.
19 156 Fed. 415 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1907).
20 Id. at 417.
21 136 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Okla. 1953).
22 Id. at 285.
23 Id. at 286. Cf. Donnell Mfg. Co. v. Wyman, 156 Fed. 415 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1907).
24 136 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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suspect mail matter pending decision of the question whether the mails are being
used unlawfully."
25
Strong disapproval of the issuance of interim impounding orders, however, has
been voiced by Mr. Justice Douglas. In Stanard v. Olesen,2 6 he stated: "I find no
statutory authority of the Post Office Department to impound mail without a hearing
and before there has been any final determination of illegal activity." However,
injunctive relief was denied because petitioner's case was then pending in the court
of appeals and a decision on the issue would render the case moot.
Petitioner in the instant case relied on Stanard v. Olesen27 in seeking injunctive
relief against the interim impounding order. The instant court granted the re-
quested injunction, ignoring prior decisions upholding its use, in apparent reliance
on the dicta from Stanard v. Olesen.28 The court further found that the require-
ments of due process precluded the use of summary power by the Postmaster General
in a fraud situation.
2
9
In reaching its decision the court reasoned that section 259 of the code grants
no express statutory authority to the Postmaster General to issue interim mail im-
pounding orders. Thus, if the authorization did exist, it would have to be implicit;
but to imply such authority would render section 259 unconstitutional as a taking
without due process of law. Here the court noted that the petitioner would be
deprived of the use of the remittances contained in the mail.30 In keeping with the
general policy of the constitutional interpretations of statutes,31 the court was un-
willing to find such an implication. As a further indication that such summary
power was not implicit, the court pointed to section 259b,3 2 which expressly pro-
vides for a twenty-day interim impounding of obscene material prior to an admin-
istrative hearing, and section 259c,3 3 which exempts obscenity cases from Adminis-
trative Procedure Act requirements. It reasoned that, since Congress explicitly gave
such summary power to the Post Office in dealing with the fly-by-night disseminator
of obscene material, it was a reasonable inference that Congress would not im-
plicitly grant such a far-reaching power. in dealing with schemes to defraud, and
it is not for the court to so extend the law."'
Here, however, the court tacitly admits the constitutionality of the power exer-
cised in the interim impounding order in section 259b. But if the taking involved
in the use of such orders is violative of due process, no statutory authorization by
Congress could validate such procedure. Conversely, if Congress could authorize
the impounding order, then the order is not unconstitutional. If the latter view is
adopted, the instant court's asserted basis for disclaiming an implicit power in section
259 to grant interim impounding orders, is unsound. On the other hand, if the
"taking" is unconstitutional, then the court cannot logically rely on the explicit
granting of power found in section 259b as an alternative basis for its decision, since
25 Id. at 752.
26 74 Sup. Ct. 768, 770 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1954). See Schwartz, Admi istrative
Law, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 85, 101-02 (1955) for a discussion of this case.
27 74 Sup. Ct. 768 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1954).
28 Ibid.
29 174 F. Supp. at 484.
30 Ibid.
31 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
32 70 Stat. 699, 39 U.S.C. § 259b (1955) provides:
Whenever the Postmaster General shall determine during proceedings
before him that in the administration of ... this title, such action is neces-
sary . . . he may enter an interim order directing that mail addressed to
any person be held and detained by the postmaster at the post office of de-
livery for a period of twenty days from the effective date of such order. ..
33 70 Stat. 699 (1955), 39 U.S.C. § 259c provides:
Action by the Postmaster General in issuing the interim order ... shall
not be subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. ...
34 174 F. Supp. at 485.
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the exercise of this power would also be an unconstitutional taking, unless a distinc-
tion can be made as to the taking involved. A distinction might possibly be drawn
on the basis that obscene material is potentially more dangerous to public interests
than is fraudulent advertising. Such a distinction would involve the recognition of
a "constitutional" difference between the dissemination of obscene material and the
perpetration of fraud. Under this theory protection of a paramount public interest
would warrant the granting of summary, "emergency" power. Yet Congress has
already indicated that the public is entitled to summary protection from fraudulent
use of the mails. Both the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities Exchange
Commission have limited jurisdiction of the mails in fraud cases.35 If the interests
of the public require it, these commissions are empowered to bring suit in a federal
district court to enjoin alleged fraudulent use of the mails pending final adminis-
trative determination of actual fraud.38
In view of the possible far-reaching consequences of the instant decision, it
cannot pass without criticism. A contradiction exists between the court's due process
argument and its reasoning in denying that section 259 implicitly authorizes the issu-
ance of interim impounding orders in fraud cases. Either the court did not see this
contradiction or, in seeing it, made a distinction as to the taking involved in obscen-
ity and fraud cases. If such a constitutional distinction exists, then the instant deci-
sion is sound. However, it is submitted that such a distinction is unwarranted.
And, if this is so, then the constitutionality of section 259b has been placed in serious
doubt. Congress should, therefore, act to expressly authorize the use of interim
impounding orders by the Postmaster General in fraud order cases.
William R. Kennedy
NEWSPAPERS - CONTEMPT - IMPROPER COMMENTS ON PENDING JUDICIAL
ACTION. - The Supreme Court of Colorado heard on appeal a tax dispute between
the State Board of Equalization and Arapahoe County and, in announcing a de-
cision in favor of the board, delayed publication of its formal written opinion for
one week. At the time the decision was announced the opinion had been written,
but had not been prepared for publication. Four days later respondent published
an editorial in his newspaper attacking the decision,1 suggesting that it was in-
spired by political rather than legal considerations, 2 and intimating that popular
disapproval might result in a written opinion mitigating some of the decision's
rigor.3 Under Colorado procedure, the parties had time to file for rehearing. Two
days after the editorial - six days after the decision - a thirty-two page opinion
was printed. Two days after the publication the court, on its own motion, cited
respondent for constructive criminal contempt. Respondent filed an answer to the
citation and orally defended himself in an open hearing. Held; two of six parti-
cipating justices dissenting: not guilty. In Re Jameson, 340 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1959).
Contempt by publication, the common law court's most effective cudgel in defend-
ing itself from journalists, has been curtailed, if not obliterated, by a solid phalanx of
relatively recent United States Supreme Court decisions. Early opinions left de-
35 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2) (Supp. 1952) (SEC has jurisdiction of securities sent through the
mails). 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1) (1952) (FTC).
36 15 U.S.C. § 77t (b) (Supp. 1952) (SEC). 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1952) (FTC).
1 "the court has chiseled away more of our vanishing local governmental rights."
The Englewood Herald, Mar. 2, 1959; quoted in 340 P.2d 423, 424 (1959).
2 "Or could it be that the justices-they are elected state-wide, too - felt that the prob-
lem of getting politically powerful school teachers paid on time justifies the means used of
issuing a quick ruling without legal opinion in its support?" Ibid.
3 "Could it have been that if the populace should rise up in wrath that the opinion could
temper down the ruling, or, if it went almost unnoticed, the court could breathe easier and
file an opinion backing up its ruling to the hilt?" Ibid.
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termination of contempts largely up to state law,4 holding that if the publication
had "a reasonable tendency" to obstruct justice, freedom of speech and the press
were not offended by summary punishment for contempt.5 Since 1941, both federal8
and state7 courts have been limited in finding published contempt to those cases in
which there is "a clear and present danger" to the administration of justice.
Using a test first applied in a World War I espionage case," the court in Nye
v. United States9 denied to federal courts, and in Bridges v. California,° to state
courts, the broad summary power traditionally exercised by English judges.
Solidifying its position in Bridges, the court in the last eighteen years has ap-
plied the "clear and present danger" test with an unanimous record of reversals
of state convictions for contempt by publication.u Both courts and legal scholars
now generally recognize the test as controlling.1 State courts occasionally show a
tendency to use other standards, 8 but the tightening of contempt power has been
general, extending even to English-speaking courts outside the United States.'4
The Supreme Court's use of the fourteenth amendment as a virtual roadblock
to punishment for contempt by publication has escaped neither opposition nor
ambiguity. None of the leading cases has been decided without dissent's and no
dependable definition of the "clear and present danger" rule has emerged from the
half dozen discussions of it since Bridges.'1 6 It remains to conjecture whether the court
would be as rigorous in cases involving juries as it has been in appeals from cases
tried solely to the court 7 but there is apparently no permissable distinction to be
drawn between elected and appointed judges.""
Constructive contempt is a criminal offense punishable summarily without a
jury trial.' 9 It is ordinarily instituted by the offended court on its own motion and
is considered to be aimed at vindication of a public, as distinguished from a private,
wrong.2 0 Usual procedural safeguards are not required, as they are in civil contempt
proceedings. 2' The offense is predicated on the act and the tendency of the act;
4 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
5 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 403 (1918).
6 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
7 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
8 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), construing the Espionage Act, 40
Stat. 217, 219 (1917).
9 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
10 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
11 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
12 See People v. Goss, 10 Ill. 2d 533, 141 N.E.2d 385 (1957), and comment, 24 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 123 (1957); Note, The Contempt Power in Montana: A Cloud on Freedom of the
Press, 18 MONT. L. REv. 68 (1956). But cf. the test set forth in THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL
OF THE PRESS 489, 505-07 (3d ed., 1956). Thayer regards the old Toledo Newspaper test
of "reasonable tendency" and the Bridges test as alternatively valid.
13 The Florida court, possibly risking another Pennekamp, recently concentrated on a
litigant's right to fair trial to the exclusion of the Bridges yardstick. Brumfield v. State, 108
So.2d 33 (Fla. 1959).
14 See, e.g., John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. v. McRae, 93 Commw. L.R. 351 (Austl. 1955),
and Consolidated Press Ltd. v. McRae, 93 Commw. L.R. 325 (Austl. 1955). Cf. Comment,
7 REs JUDICATAE 195 (1955).
15 "I shall remain unreconciled, as long as I live, to the notion that the right of talking
takes precedence over the duty to conduct trials in the only way they can be conducted
fairly." Frankfurter, J., commenting during oral argument in In Re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622
(1957); see U.S.L. WEEK 3331, 3332 (1958).
16 Justice Reed used six definitions in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 333 (1946).
See Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 398 (1950); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 376 (1927).
17 No constructive criminal contempt by publication involving a jury case has been
before the court since Bridges.
18 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377 (1947).
19 Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1959).
20 MacNeil v. United States, 236 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1956).
21 Quezada v. Superior Court, 340 P.2d 1018 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App., 2d Dist., 1959). See
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
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intention to obstruct justice is important, but not strictly necessary, and disclaimer
of intent is probably not a valid defense.22
The case out of which the publication arises must be pending in a real, and
not merely technical, sense; 23 but exact determination of the meaning of "pending"
is still apparently a question of local law.24 At least one state retains a statute
punishing "contemptuous" statements concerning past judicial acts.25 A state court
has upheld the statute,26 but its survival under the "clear and present danger" test
before a federal court is at best dubious.
Power to punish for contempt is inherent in a court of law; statutes may
modify it procedurally, 7 but every legislative attempt to take it away entirely has
been jealously spurned.2 8 It is usually said that the court must have had jurisdiction
in the matter out of which the contempt arose.
2 9
The modem decisions on the subject make it crystal clear that the essential
purpose of contempt power is the assurance of a fair trial to litigants, rather than
protection of judicial dignity.30 As the Indiana court once colorfully put it, "what-
ever may bring the law into contempt is a public calamity which, if continued, will
eventually lead to anarchy and Bolshevism." 31
In any event, fair trial considerations must be viewed in the context of the
"clear and present danger" test. 2 This often necessitates a continuance or new trial
in cases where a litigant's rights are put in peril even though no contempt arises
under the modem rationale.3 3 To complicate the problem, defendants in criminal
actions have a right to a public trial, which presumably includes some amount of
publicity.
34
A court hearing a constructive criminal contempt action which originated
during previous litigation in the same forum faces the delicate choice of finding
the publisher guilty, and thereby admitting that it was influenced by the offending
words, 35 or vindicating its judicial impartiality and dismissing the citation. The
22 State v. Schumaker, 200 Ind. 623, 163 N.E. 272 (1928); Ray v. State, 186 Ind. 396,
114 N.E. 866 (1917); Regina v. Odhams Press Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 796 (1956). For discussion
of elements of the offense, see THAYER, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 498, and DANGEL, CON-
TEMPT 168, 169-70 (1939).
23 See concurring opinion, Frankfurter, J., in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 369
(1946); Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255 (1923); Nixon v. State, 207 Ind. 426, 193 N.E. 591
(1935).
24 A determination not without its problems. See State v. District Court, 99 Mont. 33,
43 P.2d 249 (1935), following Grice v. District Court, 37 Mont. 590, 97 Pac. 1032 (1908).
25 VA. CODE ANN. § 18-255 (1950).
26 Weston v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 175, 77 S.E.2d 405 (1953).
27 Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 261, 28 Pac. 961 (1892); cf. Commonwealth v. Hoffman,
152 A.2d 726 (Pa. 1959), construing PA. STAT. tit. 42, § 1080 (1936).
28 Ex parte Shuler, 210 Cal. 377, 292 Pac. 481 (1930); Telegram Newspaper Co. v.
Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445 (1899); In Re Assignment of Huff, 352 Mich.
402, 91 N.W.2d 613 (1958); State v. Goff, 288 S.C. 17, 88 S.E.2d 788 (1955).
29 Lane v. Bradley, 339 P.2d 583 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1959); Harvey v. Prall,
97 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 1959); State v. Olsen, 340 P.2d 171 (Wash. 1959).
30 See, e.g., Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
31 Coons v. State, 191 Ind. 580, 134 N.E. 194 (1922).
32 Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
33 A continuance was granted in United States v. Dioguardi, 147 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), but denied in United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) and Irvin
v. Dowd, 153 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ind. 1957). Whether or not a continuance is called for is
a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Sundahl v. State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.W.2d
689 (1951); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 392 Pa. 528, 140 A.2d 828 (1958); Common-
wealth v. Harrison, 137 Pa. Super. 279, 8 A.2d 733 (1939). But interference with a fair
trial by the press is a constitutional ground for reversal. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50
(1951).
34 People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
35 This admission lies at the core of the dissent in the instant case. 340 P.2d 423, 438
(1959). It becomes no less delicate when an appellate court considers the contempt conviction:
"To say that [the words] had the effect of intimidating, coercing or influencing the judge from
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Colorado court, in other words, had either to admit that Jameson's editorial dis-
turbed it enough to present an obstacle to justice or deny the effect of his words
and release him. If the publisher has merely attempted to influence, but has not
succeeded, he has, by the Colorado court's reasoning, not committed a contempt.58
Contempt, of course, is a weapon peculiar to the judicial arsenal which does
not foreclose use of more common weapons. A judge may certainly resort to the
courts for damages in cases involving libel; and the instant opinion implies that
Jameson may be liable for both criminal and civil libel.3 7 The court may give an
offending publisher a severe tongue-lashing and release him without risking reversal
on constitutional grounds.3 8 Indicating the availability of extra-legal pressures, the
instant court suggested that the newspapermen of Colorado should have been able
to prevent Editor Jameson's irresponsible journalism.
3 9
The Colorado court's decision is probably in accord with the judicial tempera-
ment since 1941. But future contempt cases, particularly those involving juries, may
of necessity retreat from a situation in which "the power theoretically possessed by
the State is largely paralyzed." 40
Thomas L. Shaffer
PROCEDURE- TRIAL BY JURY-UNLESS INADEQUACY OF LEGAL REMEDIES
CAN BE SHOWN LEGAL ISSUES MUST BE TRIED BY JURY PRIOR TO COURT TRIAL
OF THE EQUITABLE ISSUES. - Plaintiff brought action to enjoin the defendant from
instituting an antitrust suit against the plaintiff, requesting also a declaration that
a grant of clearance, whereby plaintiff was allowed to show first-run movies before
any other theater, was not in violation of the antitrust laws. The defendant counter-
claimed for treble damages under the antitrust laws and requested a trial by jury;
Upon affirmance by the court of appeals of the trial judge's decision to try the
equitable issues to the court prior to jury determination of the antitrust violations
charged in the counterclaim, and of his denial of defendant's demand for a jury
his course of duty is to fail to accord him the strength of character and judicial fortitude ...
so vividly exemplified by the long record of his judicial acts." Smotherman v. United States,
186 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1950).
36 Contrast the instant decision, for instance, with the import of the following exchange
at the hearing:
"MR. JUSTICE DAY: Didn't you in fact say that as a result of public clamor, includ-
ing your own opinion, that this opinion might be withdrawn and otherwise be reversed
on that particular ground? Would you say that, that you were part of the clamor?
"MR. JAMESON: If you please, I would rather not answer the clamor.
"MR. JUSTICE DAY: You used something about the public rising up.
"MR. JAMESON: Yes, there's a reference to that sort of thing.
"MR. JUSTICE DAY: And you were part of the rising up against us, were you not,
the public rising up against us, and you inferred if it was loud enough, that the opinion
would be either tempered down or withdrawn, and that if it went unnoticed, then
the opinion would stand, that these were the things that determined it, isn't that what
you said?
"MR. JAMESON: I will let the editorial speak for itself.
"MR. JUSTICE HALL: You chose your words advisedly?
"MR. JAMESON: Yes, sir, I did." COLORADO PRESS AssOcIATIoN, SPECIAL LEGISLA-
TIVE AND LEGAL BULLETIN, Mar. 20, 1959, p. 12.
37 Editorial referred to as "defamatory," 340 P.2d 423, 427, 428; liability for libel is
discussed at 429.
38 This is an alternative not to be discounted. The instant court resorted to it, as the
Colorado Press Association predicted it would. COLORADO PRESS ASSOCIATION, CON17ENTIAL
BULLETIN, March 26, 1959, p. 1. The procedure has been followed in earlier cases. People v.
Stapleton, 18 Colo. 568, 33 Pac. 167 (1893); State v. Faulds, 17 Mont. 140, 42 Pac. 285
(1895); State v. Magee Pub. Co., 29 N.M. 455, 224 Pac. 1028 (1924).
39 340 P.2d 423, 429 (1959). Another instance: "The law-abiding, intelligent and patri-
otic people of this state will effectually settle the matter, if they are ever given an opportunity
to deal with it." State v. Shepherd, 117 Mo. 205, 76 S.W. 79 (1903).
40 Frankfurter, J., concurring in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 532 (1951).
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trial of the facts involved,' the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed.
Where equitable and legal claims are both present, the right to trial -by jury of the
legal claims takes precedence, unless inadequacy of legal remedies can be shown.
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
The seventh amendment preserves2 the right to trial by jury in actions at
common law, and the courts have endeavored to make certain that this right, as
it existed at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, is in no way curtailed.'
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the distinction between
actions in equity and at law was abolished and it was made possible, and even
necessary, that all actions be brought at the same time.4 Thus, the problem has
been raised with jury-trial implications as to which issue, legal or equitable, is to
be tried first."
In North American Philips Co. v. Brownshield,6 where the plaintiff sought an
injunction and the defendant presented a legal counterclaim, the court refused to
permit a jury trial and held that equity would decide the issues common to both
claims, any remnants then being decided at law by the jury. In a similar case7 a
jury trial demanded by the defendant was refused when his legal counterclaim
was dismissed. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Burger" held that the equitable issues
were to be determined first, even if such action would be dispositive of all the issues
in the case. However, ordinarily where the result of such order of trial would be to
completely deprive a party of his right to a jury trial, priority will be given to the
jury trial of the legal issues. Leimer v. Woods,9 however, makes it quite plain that
the right to a trial by jury can be done away with in cases in which equitable and
legal claims are mixed only if there are very special reasons for so doing. In one
case, decided soon after the adoption of the Federal Rules, there is even a hint
that all factual issues involved should be submitted to the jury
10
To determine which issue is to be tried first, Professor Moore' suggests that
the court must look to the basic issues between the parties to see whether they
are of a legal or equitable nature. Priority is then to be given to that issue more
in accord with the nature of the basic claim. The courts have tended to follow
this reasoning. 22 Thus in Ryan Distrib. Corp. v. Caley,'3 where the plaintiff sought
an injunction and a declaration that a patent of the defendant was either invalid
1 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958).
2 "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
3 In Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935), as quoted on page 501 of Beacon,
the court stated: "Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the
right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care."
4 FEr. R. Civ. P. 13 (a) (b).
5 See generally, ANNOT., 13 A.L.R.2d 777 (1950).
6 9 F.R.D. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); accord, Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 81 F. Supp.
645 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
7 Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d (2d Cir. 1942).
8 27 F. Supp. 554, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); accord, United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16, 19 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
9 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952).
10 "The entire case should have been submitted to a jury. The factual issues should not
have been tried piecemeal." Pacific Indem. Co. v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 446, 449 (9th Cir.
1939).
11 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.14 at 147 (2d ed. 1951).
12 It seems equally clear that where the complaint contains matter which is
equitable in character and the counterclaim is legal in character, the court
must determine the nature of the basic issues and if these are legal in char-
acter a demand for a jury trial must be granted. General Motors Corp. v.
California Research Corp., 9 F.R.D. 565, 568 (D. Del. 1949).
13 51 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
or was not being infringed upon, the court granted a jury trial because of the
damage issue as counterclaimed by the defendant, stating that the basic issues pre-
sented by both claims centered around the validity of a patent and its infringement,
which are legal issues.
Generally, the application of the above standard is viewed as being within the
discretion of the trial judge. American Life Ins. Co. v. Steward14 held that, since a
court has control over its own docket, it can decide which issue, is to be given
preference. A similar idea was also presented at a later date in City of Morgantown
v. Royal Inc. Co.'5 where the plaintiff sued for reformation of a contract and was
met with a counterclaim for recovery on the policy as well as a contest over the
reformation. The court said:
The latter [counterclaim] was a conventional action at law which, under
the Constitution, entitled the defendant to a jury trial. The judge contin-
ued this action at law until the prior equitable proceeding could be con-
cluded .... Here there was no intervention by a court of equity in pro-
ceedings at law, but "a mere stay of proceedings which a court of law, as
well as a court of equity, may grant in a cause pending before it by virtue
of its inherent power to control the progress of the case so as to maintain
the orderly process of justice."'16
In order to determine whether the basic nature of the claim is legal or equitable,
the courts have looked to the days of English Chancery when the rules of equity
were formulatedY. In the legislation enabling the Supreme Court to establish court
rules, Congress indicated its desire that these basic rules not be enlarged. They
warned: "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and
shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution."' 8 The same is true of the Declaratory
Judgment Act.' 9 It has been stated that this act, by itself, does not make the fact
issues either legal or equitable; 0 the act is sui generis;2 ' "the real nature of the issue
whether equitable or legal in such a suit depends upon the nature of the case."
22
Until the present case, the courts have given effect to these declarations.2
Since there was to be no change wrought in the judicial system regarding the
right to trial by jury with the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the
Federal Rules, the rules to determine equity's jurisdiction existing prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules would appear to govern. Thus equity's jurisdiction
would not be defeated unless the legal remedy is equally prompt and certain and
in other ways efficient. 4 Nor is equitable jurisdiction existing at the filing of a bill
destroyed because an adequate legal remedy may have become available thereafter.2 5
It appears that the instant Court relies chiefly upon the traditional equity
jurisdictional requirements of irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies
14 300 U.S. 203, 215 (1937). Contra, Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379
(1935).
15 337 U.S. 254 (1949).
16 Id. at 260. But see, Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942) which
holds that the decision of a court to hear an equity claim prior to a legal claim is really an
injunction against the legal claim.
17 "The equity jurisdiction conferred on inferior courts of the United States. . . is that
of the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries." Matthews
v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 529 (1932). See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 556,
604 (1852).
18 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
19 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1958).
20 Hargrove v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225, 228 (10th Cir. 1942).
21 Pacific Indem. Co. v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1939).
22 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Candimat Co., 83 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Md. 1949).
23 "However, it is not the purpose to expand the strict concept of a law action by ration-
alization beyond that covered by the constitutional guaranty." Schaefer v. Gunzburg, 246 F.2d
11, 15 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 831 (1957); Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of
Canada, 1 F.R.D. 713, 715 (D.N.J. 1941).
24 American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 214-15 (1937).
25 Ibid.
RECENT DECISIONS
to support its holding. The Court reasons that since inadequacy of legal remedies
and the threat of irreparable harm are traditional requirements for equitable
jurisdiction, at least as much is required under the Federal Rules to allow equitable
claims to be tried ahead of legal ones since, in effect, this is the same as enjoining
the legal claim.2 But the Court felt that whether or not these criteria exist is
to be determined in the light of modern judicial procedures - namely, the Declara-
tory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules. 7 As pointed out by the dissent,28 from
this it must be supposed that the instant Court interprets these procedures as ex-
panding traditional legal remedies, which would correspondingly narrow equity's
jurisdiction. As a result, the area for the exercise of judicial discretion is likewise
contracted to such an extent that the trial judge in this case is considered to have
acted outside this area of discretion. Apparently, to the mind of the Court, a solu-
tion of the antitrust violation in issue provided adequate legal relief. If this issue
were resolved in favor of the plaintiff below, then the Court could give any perma-
nent injunctive relief to which the plaintiff might be entitled on the basis of the
jury's verdict.
It is submitted that the practical effect of the Court's decision is to extensively
curtail the area in which the trial court's discretion may be meaningfully exercised
by means of an unprecedented interpretation of the Federal Rules and Declaratory
Judgment Act. It is not doubted that the Court has the power to extend the right
of trial by jury into the area in question here since there is no constitutional right
to a trial by the court without a jury.29 However, it is also true that no one has
the right to a trial by jury in a suit in equity.2 0 The practical effect of the instant
Court's decision is to make irrelevant many of the historical distinctions between
suits in equity and at law with regard to jury trialsPl cPaul J. Schieri
26 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959).
27 Id. at 507:
Inadequacy of remedy and irreparable harm are practical terms, however.
As such their existence today must be determined, not by precedents decided
under discarded procedures, but in the light of the remedies now made
available by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules. (Empha-
sis added.)
28 Id. at 518.
29 Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 136 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
30 United States v. Friedman, 89 F. Supp. 957, 961 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
31 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 518 (1959) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
